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Should a rm charge on a per-use basis or sell subscriptions when its service experiences con-
gestion? Queueing-based models of pricing primarily focus on charging a fee per use of the service,
in part because per-use pricing enables the rm to regulate congestion - raising the per-use price
naturally reduces how frequently customers use a service. The rm has less control over usage with
subscription pricing (by denition, with subscription pricing customers are not charged proportional
to their actual usage), and this is a disadvantage when customers dislike congestion. However,
we show that subscription pricing is more e¤ective at earning revenue. Consequently, the rm
may be better o¤ with subscription pricing, even, surprisingly, when congestion is intuitively most
problematic for the rm: e.g., as the industry moves to a standard of faster service, or as congestion
becomes more disliked by consumers. We show that the absolute advantage of subscription pricing
relative to per-use pricing can be substantial whereas the potential advantage of per-use pricing is
generally modest. Furthermore, the relative attractiveness of subscription pricing is enhanced if
the rm is able to earn third-party revenue from each transaction (e.g., if the rm acts as a platform
in a two-sided market). We conclude that subscription pricing can be e¤ective even if congestion
is relevant for the overall quality of a service.
How should a rm price its service when congestion is an unavoidable reality? Customers
dislike congestion, so a rm has an incentive to ensure it provides reasonably fast service. At the
same time, the rm needs to earn an economic prot, so the rms pricing scheme must generate
a su¢ cient amount of revenue. Furthermore, these issues are closely linked: the chosen pricing
scheme inuences how frequently customers use a service, which dictates the level of congestion;
congestion correlates with the customersperceived value for the service, and that determines the
amount of revenue the rm can generate.
A natural option is to charge customers a per-use fee or toll. Naor (1969) began this line of
research and there has been many subsequent extensions of his basic model, but nearly always with
a focus on per-use fees. (See Hassin and Haviv 2003 for a broad survey of this literature.)
Although the emphasis in the queueing literature has been placed on per-use pricing, other
pricing schemes are observed in practice. Most notably, some rms sell subscriptions for the use
of their service: a health club may charge an annual membership that allows a customer to use
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the facility without additional charge for each visit; AOL, an Internet service provider, initially
charged customers per-use access fees but later switched to subscription pricing (a monthly access
fee with no usage limitation); Netix, a retailer that provides movie DVDs for rental, also uses
subscription pricing (a monthly fee for an unlimited number of rentals); Disney charges an entry
fee for its theme park without charging per ride on the attractions; etcetera.
Despite the existence of subscriptions in practice, a subscription pricing strategy has a clear
limitation in the presence of congestion e¤ects: subscribers are not charged per use, so it is intuitive
that they seek service too frequently (e.g., use the health club too often), thereby increasing conges-
tion and decreasing the value all subscribers receive from the service. As a result, in a setting with
clear congestion costs (e.g., in a queueing model) one might assume that subscription pricing would
be inferior to per-use pricing. However, in this paper we demonstrate that subscription pricing may
indeed be a rms better pricing strategy despite its limitations with respect to congestion. We do
so in three di¤erent capacity management scenarios: (i) the rms service capacity is exogenously
xed; (ii) the rms service capacity adjusts to meet an industry standard for congestion; and (iii)
the rm endogenously chooses its service capacity in addition to its pricing policy.
In addition to a focus on per-use pricing, the queuing literature also assumes that revenues are
earned only directly from customers, i.e., the per-use fees are assumed to be the only source of
revenue. However, in some situations a rm is able to earn additional revenue from third-party
sources, such as advertising revenue that is proportional to the actual use of its service (e.g., AOL).
We demonstrate that the presence of such revenue favors subscription pricing relative to per-use
pricing.
The next section reviews the extensive literature on pricing services, with an emphasis on models
that address the issue of congestion. Section 2 details our base model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 compare
the two pricing schemes under three di¤erent assumptions for how the rms capacity is determined.
Section 6 considers our model with third-party revenue. Section 7 summarizes our conclusions.
1 Related Literature
Our work is primarily related to three streams of literature: pricing in queueing models; the theory
of clubs; and advance purchase pricing. Furthermore, there are some connections between our
work and the relatively recent literature on two-sided markets.
Queueing theory provides a natural framework for modeling congestion, and we adopt that
framework as well. However, as already mentioned, the literature on pricing of queues generally
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only considers per-use pricing (e.g., Littlechild 1974, Edelson and Hilderbrand 1975, De Vany 1976,
Mendelson 1985, Chen and Frank 2004). Per-use pricing is su¢ cient for maximizing social welfare,
but it is known that a prot maximizing rm does not choose the welfare maximizing price (e.g.,
Naor 1969).
Randhawa and Kumar (2008) and Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008) do consider
additional pricing schemes in queueing models. Randhawa and Kumar (2008) compare per-use
pricing with a subscription pricing that imposes limits on usage, e.g., Netix has a plan in which
a customer can view as many movies as they want as long as they do not possess more than four
DVDs at a time. They show that this constrained subscription plan may be better for the rm
than the unconstrained per-use pricing because it reduces the volatility of the demand process the
rm experiences. We do not consider subscription pricing with limitations, i.e., in our model
a subscription pricing plan allows for unlimited usage. Furthermore, in their model the two
plans have the same revenue potential, whereas in our model a key di¤erence is that subscription
pricing can have a higher revenue potential than per-use pricing. Hence, the restriction on usage
with their subscription plan is necessary to create a distinction between the two pricing schemes.
Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008) study a two-part tari¤ that combines both per-use
and subscription pricing. Their focus is di¤erent than ours: they do not compare per-use to
subscription pricing and instead emphasize how consumer uncertainty regarding service quality
a¤ects the dynamics of their system over time (in our model consumers have rational expectations,
so we do not explicitly model the learning process).
There is a literature in economics on the pricing of shared facilities (i.e., clubs) subject to
congestion, such as swimming pools and golf clubs: e.g., Berglas (1976), Scotchmer (1985). Just as
in our model, customers prefer that the service/facility is used by fewer people so that there is less
congestion. These papers show that a two-part tari¤ is optimal for the rm: a per-use fee is chosen
to induce a usage level that maximizes social welfare and a subscription fee is charged to transfer
all rents from customers to the rm. Like Bitran, Rocha e Oliveira and Schilkrut (2008), these
papers do not compare per-use pricing to subscription pricing. Strictly speaking, according to our
model the rm always prefers the two-part tari¤ over either subscription or per-use pricing (each
is a subset of the set of two-part tari¤s). However, we believe a comparison between subscription
and per-use pricing is warranted. The queueing literature focuses on per-use pricing and both
per-use pricing and subscriptions are observed in practice. In addition, a two-part tari¤ may not
be desirable for reasons that we do not model (nor are generally modeled): e.g., a consumer may
dislike being charged twice for the same service, especially if they do not understand the motivation
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for such a pricing scheme.
Barro and Romer (1987) demonstrate that per-use pricing can be equivalent to subscription
pricing. For example, they argue that a ski slope could generate the same revenue by charging a
fee per ride or by charging a daily lift ticket price (which is analogous to a one-day subscription).
However, in their model they assume demand exceeds the supply of ski-lift rides no matter what
pricing scheme is used. Hence, a daily lift ticket price can be chosen such that usage is the same
as with a per-ride price. In contrast, in our model consumers regulate their usage depending on
the pricing scheme - subscription pricing leads consumers to use the facility more than any positive
per-use pricing scheme. Hence, in our model the two schemes are not equivalent.
Our subscription pricing scheme resembles advance-purchase pricing (e.g., DeGraba, 1995; Xie
and Shugan 2001). When consumers purchase in advance of the service, such as buying a concert
ticket weeks before the event, consumers are willing to pay their expected value for the service. In
contrast, when consumers spot purchase, i.e., when they know their value for the service, they are
naturally willing to pay only their realized value. When purchasing in advance, consumers are more
homogeneous relative to the spot market, so the rm can earn more revenue by selling in advance
than by selling just with a spot price: it can be better to sell in advance to every customer at their
expected value than to sell in the spot market to a portion of consumers (i.e., those consumers with
a high realized value). In our model subscriptions also has this ability to extract rents because
consumers are more homogeneous when they purchase subscriptions than when they purchase on
a per-use basis. However, we consider the impact of congestion, whereas the advance-purchase
models do not (i.e., consumers in those models do not regulate their usage based on the pricing
policy).1
The literature on two-sided markets considers the interaction between a platform that inter-
mediates between two markets or groups (e.g., Armstrong 2006 and Rochet and Tirole 2006). For
example, a newspaper provides content to consumers and print ads to businesses. The characteris-
tic feature of these markets is the presence of inter-market positive externalities that depend on the
size of each market. For example, the value a business receives from advertising in a newspaper
depends on the size of the newspapers readership base. These models focus on the platforms
pricing scheme with each market. They demonstrate that it can be optimal for the platform to
subsidize one market (i.e., charge a low price, possibly zero) to generate positive externalities on the
1There is another di¤erence between our model and the advance-purchasing literature. Our rm chooses a single
price (either a subscription price or a per-use price). In fact, it is never optimal for the rm to o¤er both per-use
and subscription pricing at the same time. In the advance-purchasing literature two prices are often considered (the
advance price and the spot price).
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other market - the lost revenue from the subsidized market is compensated by the extra revenue in
the other market. This literature does not consider the negative externalities (i.e., congestion) that
could be created when one market increases its size (or transaction volume), as we do. Further-
more, they do not compare subscription versus per-use pricing. We demonstrate that subscription
pricing generates the benet of a subsidy without its cost: the lack of per-use fees generates the
desired positive externality on the other market while the subscription fee allows the rm to still
earn revenue.
2 Model Description
A single rm provides a service to a market of potential homogenous customers of size M . Each
customer nds the service to be valuable on multiple occasions, or service opportunities. For
example, a customer may wish to occasionally use a teller at her bank, use the internet repeatedly
or rent a movie at least a couple of times per month. This stream of service opportunities occurs
for each customer at rate  : At the moment of a service opportunity a customer observes the value,
or utility, V; she would receive if she were to receive the service to satisfy that opportunity. Service
values for each customer are independent and identically distributed across opportunities.2
Although customers value receiving the service, all else being equal, they prefer as fast a service
process as possible - each customer incurs a cost w per unit of time to complete service (time waiting
and in service). Hence, our model is appropriate for services that potentially exhibit varying levels
of congestion. Finally, consumers neither receive utility nor incur disutility when not in the service
process and waiting for the next service opportunity to arise.
The rm o¤ers one of two pricing schemes: a per-use fee or a subscription price. The per-use
fee, p; is a charge for each service completion: e.g., a fee for withdrawing money from an automatic
teller machine, a fee for each visit to a health club, or a per minute fee for accessing a database.
A subscription price, k; is a fee per unit of time which is independent of the amount of service
the customer receives. (In our model this denition of a subscription is equivalent to a xed fee
for a nite duration with unlimited usage during that time.3) Where useful, we use pand s
subscripts to signify notation associated with the per-use and subscription schemes, respectively.
2Hence, we have a single market segment of consumers, so di¤erences between per-use and subscription pricing
are not driven by a desire to price discriminate between segments, as in Essegaier, Gupta and Zhang (2002).
3 In practice it is common to dene a subscription as a xed fee for a nite period, such as a newspaper subscription
for 6 months. In our model consumers receive a steady stream of identically valued service opportunities and
customers are risk neutral. As a result, any subscription dened as a xed fee, K; for a duration, d; is equivalent in
our model to a subscription rate k = K=d:
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When a service opportunity occurs, a customer decides whether or not to seek service (i.e.,
join the rms service system). The decision is based on three factors: the value of the service
opportunity, the cost associated with the expected time to complete the service transaction and the
rms pricing policy. Although the customer observes the value for a particular service opportunity
before deciding to seek service or not, the customer does not observe the rms current queue length.
However, the customer has an expectation for the average arrival rate of customers to the rms
service, ; and the customer knows the function that translates an arrival rate into an expected
service time, W ():4 We use the term service time to refer to the total time to complete the
service, i.e., it includes time waiting and in service. The function W () exhibits the following
natural properties: W 0() > 0 and W 00()  0: Thus, wW () is the expected cost to the customer
of the time to receive one service opportunity. We refer to wW () as the service time cost or
the congestion cost. Note, a customer cannot balk (or, chooses not to balk) from the queue after
choosing to seek service (otherwise, the customer would e¤ectively be able to observe the queue
length before the joining decision is made).5 Finally, the rms pricing policy clearly inuences the
customers decision. With each service opportunity the customer decides whether to seek service
based on the amount of utility that would be earned from the opportunity relative to congestion
costs and the rms per-use fee (which in the case of subscription pricing, is zero). Whether to
adopt a subscription is based on the expected arrival of service opportunities and their expected
net utilities. Consumers are risk neutral and make choices based on the average utility each option
generates (rather than the discounted utility of each option). In addition, consumers make pure
strategy choices (join the service system or not, subscribe or not). Allowing mixed strategy choices
either favors subscription pricing or has no impact on our results.6
4This is actually a stronger informational assumption than is needed. We merely require the customer to have
an expectation of the rms service time and that expectation must be correct (i.e., they do not need to know the
relationship between the service time and ):
5We suspect our qualitative results continue to hold even if balking is allowed. In that case, subscription consumers
join only if the queue length is su¢ ciently small so that the value from the service exceeds the expected time costs.
Per-use customers make essentially the same decision, but they compare their net utility (value minus per-use fee) to
the expected waiting cost. Hence, for any queue length, the arrival rate to the system with subscription pricing will
be no less than with per-use and generally will be strictly greater. Therefore, subscription pricing still leads to more
congestion than per-use pricing. Furthermore, consumers are still homogeneous when deciding whether to purchase
a subscription or not (because they base their decision on expected usage and system time costs). We do not work
with the balking model because it is analytically more cumbersome - the system time function, W () is analytically
complex and probably depends on the particular pricing scheme in use (whereas in our model it depends only on the
arrival rate, ):
6Consumers need to decide with each service opportunity whether to seek service or not. The optimal strategy
for a consumer is always a pure strategy conditional on the value of the service opportunity. Hence, including mixed
strategies has no impact with this decision. Regarding the subscription decision, we nd that the rms prot can
be higher if mixed strategies are allowed in the exogenous capacity model. However, the rms prot is unchanged
in the other two capacity models by the inclusion of mixed strategies.
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The servers processing rate is . (Thus, W (0) = 1= because 1= is a customers service
time when there is no congestion.) In section 3 we assume  is exogenous, whereas in section 4
the rm adjusts  to meet an exogenously set standard for service time and in section 5 the rm
chooses  subject to a fee that is proportional to the service rate. Naturally, W () is decreasing
in : Furthermore, we assume W (M) is su¢ ciently small relative to 1= ; where  = M is the
maximum possible arrival rate of service opportunities (i.e., the arrival rate when every customer
seeks service at every service opportunity). This implies that for a xed potential arrival rate
of service, ; the potential population of customers, M; is large and they do not seek service too
frequently ( is small). Consequently, the arrival rate to the rms queue is (approximately)
independent of the queue length (which is typically assumed in the queueing literature) and there
is little chance that a service opportunity arises while a customer is in the service process. For
example, a customer does not receive another need to withdraw cash from an automatic teller
machine while the customer is in the process of withdrawing cash.7
To complete the denition of the model, we provide some additional structure for the service
value distribution and the system-time function. Let F () be the distribution function and f ()
the density function of each service value: assume F is di¤erentiable, F (0) = 0; and F exhibits an
increasing failure rate (IFR). For some results we invoke one of the following additional assumptions
related to the hazard rate, h(x) = f(x)= F (x); where F (x) = 1  F (x):
Assumption 1 (A1) h0(x)=h(x)2 is decreasing
Assumption 2 (A2) xh0(x) is increasing
(A2) holds for a power distribution with parameter  > 1; while both (A1) and (A2) hold if
F is uniform on the support [0; v] or Weibull with parameters   1 and  > 0. (Note, a Weibull
distribution with  = 1 is an exponential distribution.) In all three versions of the model, we
assume F is uniform on the support [0; v] to derive analytical comparisons between the pricing
schemes: Regarding the system-time function, for the industry standard model (section 4) and
in the capacity choice model (section 5), we assume W () = 1=(   ); which corresponds to
the expected time in an M=M=1 queue with rst-come-rst serve priority. Furthermore, we use
that functional form to compare the pricing schemes in the exogenous capacity model (section 3).
The electronic companion provides details for results we claim in this text without explicit proof
7See Randhawa and Kumar (2008) for a model of a closed queueing system in which a consumers service oppor-
tunity process is turned o¤when the consumer is in the service system. Consequently, in their model the arrival
rate to the queue depends on the number of customers in queue.
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or support. Some of our analytical results can be obtained under less restrictive distributional
assumptions, and these are noted in the electronic companion. Furthermore, the electronic com-
panion provides numerical evidence that our results generalize beyond the specic assumptions we
adopt for analytical tractability.
3 Exogenous Capacity
In this section we analyze a version of our model in which the rms service processing rate, ; or
capacity, is exogenously xed with either pricing scheme. This analysis is appropriate for a rm
that has the short term exibility to modify its pricing but does not have the short term ability
to alter its capacity. For each pricing scheme we derive the rms equilibrium arrival rate and
optimal revenues, which allows us to establish conditions under which one scheme is preferred over
another.
3.1 Per-Use Pricing
With per-use pricing a customer observes the realized value of a particular service opportunity and
then requests service if the net utility is non-negative, i.e., the value of that opportunity is greater
than or equal to p+ wW ().8 Given that p, w and  are common to all customers (they all have
the same expectations) and constant across time, there is some threshold value, v; such that a
customer seeks service whenever the realized value of an opportunity is v or greater, and otherwise
the customer passes on the opportunity:
v = p+ wW ():
The actual arrival rate to the service is then  F (v) : For expectations to be consistent with actual
operating conditions (i.e.,  =  F (v)) the threshold v must satisfy
v = p+ wW
 
 F (v)

: (1)
Given that W is increasing, it follows that there is a unique solution to (1). Furthermore, the
threshold is increasing in the per-use fee, p:
8 In some situations it is reasonable to suspect that the waiting cost function is not constant, but it depends on
the value that the consumer attaches to the service opportunity. A consumer may nd waiting more or less costly
as she values the service more. Most of the results in this section generalize for a linear waiting cost function (i.e.
w(v) = a+ bv, where b can be either positive or negative).
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The rms revenue is Rp = p; which can be expressed in terms of the threshold v :
Rp(v) =  F (v)
 
v   wW ( F (v))

:
The following theorem establishes that an optimal threshold, vp, exists and is unique (with this
and the subsequent theorems, see the appendix for the proofs).
Theorem 1 The per-use revenue function, Rp(v); is quasi-concave and vp = argmaxv Rp(v) is
uniquely dened by
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+ wW ( F (vp)) + w F (vp)W
0( F (vp)): (2)
To translate vp back into an actual price, the rms optimal per-use fee is
pp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+ w F (vp)W
0( F (vp)):
3.2 Subscription Pricing
With a subscription scheme there is no explicit fee charged per transaction, e.g., the members of a
health club can use the service whenever they wish without additional charge. However, a customer
may not take advantage of a service opportunity if her value for that opportunity is low relative
to her expectation of congestion costs, and that expectation depends on the number of subscribers
and the frequency of their usage. For now, we assume all consumers subscribe and then we conrm
that expectation is correct. As a result, if each consumer uses the threshold vs to decide whether
to seek service or not, then the arrival rate to the service is  F (vs) :  is the arrival rate of service
opportunities conditional that all M consumers are subscribers and F (vs) is the fraction of service
opportunities that generate a service request. In equilibrium, the indi¤erent consumers value, vs;
exactly equals the expected congestion cost:
vs = wW
 
 F (vs)

: (3)
Now consider whether to purchase a subscription or not. At the time this decision is made
the customer does not know when future service opportunities will occur or their values, but does
know his/her threshold value, vs, for seeking service. Hence, as part of the purchasing decision, a
customer expects that a subscription generates the following net value per service opportunity,
F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
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F (vs) is the probability a service opportunity is su¢ ciently valuable to seek service, E [V jV  vs] is
the value received conditional that a service opportunity yields a value greater than the threshold
and the last term, vs; is the expected congestion cost (from (3)).
Given that service opportunities arrive at rate  , it is optimal for the rm to set the subscription
rate, k; equal to the value of a subscription per unit of time (net of system-time cost)9:
k =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
All consumers purchase a subscription even though they are indi¤erent between doing so or not,
which conrms our initial assumption that all consumers subscribe.10 As a result, subscription
pricing allows the rm to extract all consumer surplus, conditional on the level of congestion that
subscriptions generate.11
The rms resulting revenue can be expressed in terms of the threshold vs :
Rs(vs) = kM =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) :
Note, while the threshold vp was a decision variable for the rm with per-use pricing, the rm has
no control over the threshold vs with subscription pricing - it is set by (3). In other words, with
subscription pricing (and exogenous capacity) the rm cannot control congestion, even though it
possesses an e¤ective mechanism for maximizing revenue conditional on the systems congestion.
3.3 Comparison between Pricing Schemes
This section compares the revenues generated by the two pricing schemes. To make these compar-
isons more explicit, we assume in this section V  U [0; v] and W () = 1=(  ):
Per-use pricing allows the rm to control congestion by regulating the service arrival rate, but
the per-use fee must also earn rents for the rm. In contrast, subscription pricing is weak with
respect to controlling congestion, but does allow the rm to extract rents e¢ ciently. The rms
preference between these two schemes, therefore, depends on the relative strength of these two
countervailing factors.
9Lowering k merely reduces revenue per customer without changing demand, so that cannot be optimal. There is
no demand with a higher k; so that is not optimal either.
10 If consumers can adopt a mixed strategy with respect to the subscription purchase decision, then the rm may be
able to earn a higher prot by charging an even higher subscription rate. If it does so, then each consumer purchases
a subscription with some probability, say ; so that the expected arrival rate is  F (vs) and vs = wW
 
 F (vs)

:
Hence, our results provide a lower bound on the prot with subscription pricing.
11As discussed in section 1, in advance selling models the rm extracts all consumer surplus with the advance
price. However, in those models the potential consumer surplus is independent of the pricing scheme, whereas here
the amount is not (it depends on how much congestion materializes).
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We now dene the set of parameters for which the rm can earn non-negative revenue. Although
the rms problem is determined by four parameters (w; ;  and v), the next theorem indicates
that the pricing schemesrelative rankings depend only on two of them.
Lemma 1 The optimal revenue with each pricing scheme (Rp and Rs) can be expressed in terms
of ; ,  and v; where  = w=v and  = =: Furthermore, the two revenues are non-negative
for  2 [0; 1] and linear in v: Consequently, the relative revenue, Rs=Rp; can be expressed in
terms of  and .
The term v merely scales the revenues, so it does not inuence their relative rankings. Instead,
whether per-use pricing or subscriptions are preferred depends on  (which measures the relative
strength of congestion costs to service values) and the potential utilization rate of the system, :
Theorem 2 For each value of , there exists a unique e (), such that subscription yields higher
revenue than per-use pricing for  < e() (recall,  is the potential utilization, =): Otherwise,
per-use pricing yields higher revenue. Moreover, e() is decreasing in .
From Theorem 2, per-use is preferred over subscription for highly congested systems. The
key issue is the degree of congestion needed for per-use to be preferred. For various levels of
congestion costs, ; Table 1 provides the potential utilization rate, e(); at which the two schemes
yield the same revenue. It can be demonstrated that lim!0 e() = p2 and lim!1 e() = 1:
Thus, subscription pricing always generates higher revenue than per-use pricing when the potential
arrival rate to the queue is less than the processing rate. Subscription pricing can be preferred
even if the potential arrival rate is as much as 140% of the rms processing rate. Subscription
pricing can also be preferred when the systems actual utilization rate is high. Table 1 lists the
systems actual utilization rate when the potential utilization rate is e(): For example, when
 = 0:01 and  = 1:411, subscription pricing yields the same revenue as per-use pricing even
though the actual utilizations are 96.8% and 64.8% respectively. In addition, the actual utilization
rates are increasing in : Thus, when  = 0:01; subscription pricing is preferred whenever it yields
an actual utilization rate that is lower than 96.8%. Hence, although subscription pricing cannot
control congestion well, it still generates higher revenue than per-use pricing even in systems with
a considerable amount of congestion.
To explore the strength of subscription pricing further, the next theorem characterizes revenues
with extreme levels of potential congestion.
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Table 1. Potential utilization rates, e () ; that yield identical revenue with per-use and subscription
pricing, as well as actual utilizations when the potential arrival rate is e ().
Actual utilization (%)
when  = e ()
 e () Per-use Subscription
0:99 1:002 0:3 0:5
0:75 1:069 7:1 13:8
0:50 1:153 16:4 31:3
0:25 1:264 30:5 55:5
0:01 1:411 64:8 96:8
Theorem 3 The following limits hold: (i) lim!0Rs = v (1 + )
2 =2 and lim!0Rp = v (1 + )
2 =4.
(ii) lim!1Rs=Rp = 0 and lim!1Rx = 0; x 2 fs; pg.
Subscription pricing generates twice as much revenue as per-use when capacity is unlimited
( = 0). Therefore, subscription pricing starts with a considerable advantage relative to per-use
pricing. As a result, congestion needs to be substantial in the system before the congestion-
controlling benets of per-use pricing dominates the rent-extracting capability of subscription pric-
ing. Furthermore, revenue declines in  with all schemes, so per-use pricing dominates subscription
pricing only when revenues are in fact low. This suggests that per-use pricing can provide only
a modest absolute advantage relative to subscription pricing, but the absolute advantage of sub-
scription pricing can be substantial. Taken together, these results indicate that from a practical
perspective, subscription pricing can indeed be better than per-use pricing even if capacity is xed
and the system is subject to congestion related costs.
4 Industry Standard for Service Time
In this section we consider a model in which the rm must conform to a predetermined industry
standard for service time. For example, in the call-center industry it is common to set a standard
in terms of the probability that a customers wait will not exceed a certain amount of time (Gans
et al. 2003; Cleveland and Mayben 1997). We want to determine how the presence of an industry
standard inuences the relative performance of the pricing schemes we study.
We continue to work with the assumption that the rms service process can be well approxi-
mated by an M=M=1 queue, i.e., W () = 1=(   ). In that case, let T be the time a customer
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spends in the service process (again, waiting and in service), and let t be a benchmark time:
Pr fT  tg = 1  e ( )t (4)
Dene the industry standard to be that customers are in the system no more than t units of time
with at least probability : From (4), the rm must have the following minimum capacity to achieve
this standard:
 = +
log (1  )
t
;
i.e., the rm must have enough capacity to process its arrival rate plus a xed bu¤er that only
depends on the industry standard. For notational convenience, dene I =    , so I is the size
of that bu¤er and an increase in I implies an increase in the standard.
We assume the rm adjusts its capacity to meet the standard, but each unit of capacity costs
the rm c per unit of time. Therefore, to the extent that the rms arrival rate of customers varies
between pricing schemes, so does its capacity, as already mentioned.
4.1 Per-Use Pricing
As in the xed capacity model, with per-use pricing a customer with value v is indi¤erent between
requesting service or not, where v = p + w=
 
  F (v)

= p + w=I. The rms prot function,
assuming the arrival rate is strictly positive, in terms of this threshold, is
p(v) =  F (v)p  c(v)
=  F (v)

v   w
I
  c

  cI;
where (v) = F (v) + I is the rms capacity. The following theorem establishes that an optimal
threshold, vp, exists and is unique.
Theorem 4 The per-use prot function p(v) is quasi-concave and vp = argmaxv p(v) is uniquely
dened by
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+
w
I
+ c (5)
As the standard increases, more customers use the service (vp decreases) even though the per-use
price, p(vp) = F (vp)=f(vp) + c; increases.
Due to the xed cost, cI; the rm may not earn a positive prot, i.e., p(vp) < 0 is possible. If
(A1) holds, we nd that p(vp) is convex-concave in I: In such case, prot is negative if the standard
is too low or too high. If the standard is too low, the service is of poor quality so few customers
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use it sparingly, thereby generating too little revenue. If the standard is too high, customers use
the service extensively, but at a decreasing rate, so the incremental revenues cannot cover the large
cost of the necessary bu¤er capacity. Positive prot requires an intermediate standard to provide
enough demand without an excessive capacity cost.
4.2 Subscription Pricing
There exists a threshold, vs; as in the xed capacity model, such that all consumers with value
vs or higher seek service, vs = w=
 
s   F (vs)

; conditional that all consumers are subscribers.
To conform to the industry standard, capacity adjusts so that (vs) = F (vs) + I; which implies
vs = w=I in equilibrium. The subscription rate is set so that all consumers purchase a subscription
(which conrms the initial assumption that all are subscribers) and the rms prot is then
s(vs) = F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs)  c(vs)
= F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs   c)  cI
There is no guarantee that s(vs)  0. As with per-use pricing, if (A1) holds, then s(vs) is
convex-concave in I - prots are positive only with intermediate levels of the standard.
4.3 Comparison
As in the xed capacity model, we assume V  U [0; v] in this section to compare subscription and
per-use pricing. Subscription pricing results in a higher arrival rate than per-use pricing (i.e., a
lower threshold, vs = w=I < vp) and requires more capacity ((vs) > (vp)) to ensure the standard
is met. The next theorem establishes a useful comparative result.
Theorem 5 If I > w= (v   c) ; then @p=@I < @s=@I.
The condition in Theorem 5, w=I < v   c; is necessary for prot to be positive with either
scheme, but not su¢ cient: with either pricing scheme prot is negative when I  w= (v   c).
Therefore, the industry standard must be su¢ ciently high for either scheme to earn a positive
prot (but not too high). Furthermore, increasing the standard favors subscription pricing relative
to per-use pricing in the sense that s  p is increasing in I.12 In fact, s > p whenever
w
v  
 p
2 + 1

c
 I : (6)
12Theorem 5 generalizes for all distributions that satisfy (A1) by requiring F (vp) < F (vs) (1  ch (vs)) instead of
I > w= (v   c) (the latter condition is equivalent to the former for the uniform distribution). It can be shown that
for all distributions that satisfy (A1), there exists a unique eI such that @p=@eI = @s=@eI. Hence, a higher industry
standard favors subscription under broader conditions.
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less expensive capacity and lower sensitivity to congestion favor subscription pricing, which is
intuitive. However, (6) also indicates that a higher industry standard favors subscription, which is
surprising: it might seem that a pricing structure that is better at controlling congestion would be
preferable when service time standards are more strict. To explain, note that when the standard
is very high, most of the capacity is bu¤er capacity, i.e.,   I (or, put another way, I >> ):
Hence, with a high standard, the two schemes incur nearly the same capacity cost. Moreover, with
a high standard, service times are nearly inconsequential because there is essentially no congestion.
Without congestion, the revenue rate equals v=2 under subscription pricing and v=4 under per-
use pricing. Therefore, subscription is more likely to be protable when the industry standard is
high  its revenue rate is much higher so it is more likely to cover the large xed cost of excess
capacity.13
5 Capacity Choice
In section 3 the rm can choose how to price but not its capacity, so the pricing decision results
only in variation in service time. In section 4 the rm can choose how to price but not the service
time it delivers, so the pricing decision results only in variation in capacity. In this section the rm
chooses how to price and its capacity, so the pricing decision inuences both the rms capacity
and its service time. As in section 4, capacity is expensive - the rm incurs a cost at rate c for
maintaining capacity ; where c > 0: Furthermore, we continue to assume W () = 1=(  ).
5.1 Per-Use Pricing
The consumers choice in this setting is the same as in the xed capacity model. As a result, we
can express the rms prot function in terms of the threshold of the indi¤erent consumer, v, and
capacity:
p (v; ) = Rp(v)  c
=  F (v)

v   w
   F (v)

  c:
13The comparison between s and p is more complex if one restricts attention to positive prot. It is possible
that subscription pricing is protable for some standards whereas per-use pricing is not protable for all standards.
The opposite is possible as well: s < 0 for all standards while p > 0 for some standards. Finally, it is also possible
that s < 0 < p for I < I 0; 0 < s < p for I 0 < I < I 00; 0 < p < s for I 00 < I < I 000; and p < 0 < s
for I 000 < I < I 0000: However, even in this analysis, subscription pricing tends to be more protable as the standard
increases.
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The prot function is concave in ; so it is straightforward to determine that p(v) is the rms
optimal capacity for a given threshold, v, where,
p(v) =  F (v) +
r
w F (v)
c
:
(Note, although our notation is similar, this capacity function is di¤erent than in the industry
standard model, section 4.) The rms prot rate is then
p (v) = p
 
v; p(v)

= 

F (v)(v   c)  2
q
F (v)

where the constant  is dened for convenience:
 =
p
cw=:
The following theorem establishes the uniqueness of the optimal per-use threshold.
Theorem 6 If v > c, there exists an upper bound p, such that for every   p there exists a
unique optimal threshold, vp = argmaxv p(v) that yields positive prot, p(vp)  0: This threshold
is the smallest solution to the implicit equation given by:
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+
q
F (vp)
+ c: (7)
Furthermore, if (A1) holds, then there exist two solutions to (7) and the smallest solution is the
unique optimal threshold. The optimal capacity is
p =  F (vp) +

q
F (vp)
c
(8)
and the rms per-use fee is
pp = vp   w=
 
p    F (vp)

:
The bound in Theorem 6, p; merely states that the rm can earn a positive prot only if
capacity is su¢ ciently cheap, customers are su¢ ciently patient and the market is su¢ ciently large.
5.2 Subscription Pricing
With subscription pricing and a xed capacity the rm has little control over congestion. However,
the rm gains some control over congestion when the rm can choose its capacity. In particular,
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if  is the rms capacity, then a consumer with value v = w=
 
   F (v)

is indi¤erent between
seeking service or not. Instead of thinking in terms of the rm choosing , we can use that
relationship to frame the rms problem in terms of choosing the threshold, v;
s(v) =  F (v) + w=v
The rms prot function can then be written as
s(v) =  F (v) (E[V jV  v]  v)  c
 
 F (v) + w=v

where the rst term is the revenue the rm earns from subscriptions assuming the rm chooses the
maximum subscription fee that induces all consumers to purchase a subscription, conditional on
the expected level of congestion.
Theorem 7 If E [V ] > c, there exists an upper bound s, such that for every   s, there exists
an optimal threshold, vs 2 argmaxs(v); that yields positive prot, s(vs)  0: That threshold is
implicitly dened by:
vs = 
s
1
F (vs)  cf(vs)
: (9)
Furthermore, if (A2) holds, then there exist two solutions to (9) and the smallest solution is the
unique optimal threshold.
As with Theorem 6, Theorem 7 indicates that a positive prot occurs only when capacity is not
too expensive, customers do not incur time costs that are too high and there is a su¢ cient number
of customers in the market. However, the two bounds, p and s need not be the same.
5.3 Comparison
In this section we assume V  U [0; v]; but we observe numerically that these results hold for the
Weibull distribution with   1.
As with a xed capacity, it is possible to show that per-use pricing leads to a system with less
congestion than subscription pricing: vs < vp: The rm invests more in capacity with subscription
pricing (to control congestion somewhat) than with per-use pricing: p < s: Even though the
rm invests more in capacity with subscription pricing, congestion is also higher with that scheme:
us(c) > up(c); where ux(c) is the actual utilization rate,
ux(c) =  F (vx)=x; x 2 fs; pg:
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If capacity is inexpensive, c = 0; subscription pricing performs strictly better than per-use
pricing,
s(vsjc = 0) > p(vpjc = 0) :
without the concern of congestion, the revenue extraction benet of subscription pricing dominates.
However, subscription prots decrease at a faster rate with respect to the cost of capacity,
@s (vs)
@c
<
@p (vp)
@c
< 0 :
subscription pricing is more sensitive to capacity costs than per-use pricing. Dene cx; as the max-
imum capacity cost that allows a non-negative prot with pricing scheme x 2 fs; pg : Combining
these results, one of two scenarios emerges: either cs  cp or cp  cs:
Consider the rst scenario, cs  cp. There exists some ~c such that the two schemes earn the
same prot, s (vsj~c) = p (vpj~c) > 0: It follows that subscription yields higher prot than per-use
pricing for c 2 [0; ~c] while per-use is better for c 2 [~c; cp]. Furthermore, for c 2 [cs; cp]; subscription
pricing cannot earn a positive prot whereas per-use pricing does. That is what one might expect
given that subscription pricing gives the rm less control over congestion - if capacity costs are
su¢ ciently high, per-use pricing is preferable and may be the only scheme that yields a positive
prot.
Now consider the second scenario, cp  cs: Subscription pricing is preferred if c 2 [0; cp] and
subscription pricing is the only scheme that returns a positive prot if c 2 [cp; cs]: In other words,
it is possible that subscription pricing is the preferred scheme for any capacity cost that allows
the rm to make a prot. Furthermore, if capacity is su¢ ciently expensive, it is possible that
subscription pricing can yield a prot whereas per-use pricing cannot: in those situations capacity
is su¢ ciently expensive that per-use pricing is unable to extract enough revenue from customers to
cover the cost of capacity.14
Figure 1 illustrates these results. The left hand graph corresponds with the rst scenario
and the right hand graph corresponds to the second scenario. We note that subscription pricing
performs better than per-use if the capacity cost is low. Furthermore, while per-use pricing can be
more protable than subscription pricing, it is only more protable when capacity is su¢ ciently
expensive. As a result, the absolute advantage of per-use pricing is generally small, whereas the
absolute advantage of subscription pricing can be large.
14This result provides an interesting contrast with the necessary conditions for each pricing scheme to be protable.
Recall, E [V ] > c is necessary for subscription pricing while the less restrictive v > c is necessary for per-use pricing.
These are only necessary conditions, and not su¢ cient conditions, as we have demonstrated. Therefore, it would be
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Figure 1. Prot rates of the two pricing schemes with respect to the capacity cost, c. The following
parameter values are used: (a) w = 0:05; and (b) w = 0:5. ( = 1 and v = 10 in both panels.)
The only di¤erence between the two panels in Figure 1 is that the right hand side has a higher
waiting cost: w = 0:5 instead of w = 0:05. In fact, it can be shown that there exists a ew such that
for all w > ew the second scenario occurs, i.e., if the waiting cost is su¢ ciently high, subscription
pricing dominates per-use pricing for all capacity costs that yield a positive prot. In other words,
when congestion is most costly, in the sense that the service-time cost is high, then subscription
pricing can be better than per-use pricing even though it has less control over congestion. This
counter-intuitive result is similar to our nding for the industry standard model - if congestion costs
are high, a large capacity must be chosen to minimize congestion, and this can only be protable
when the pricing scheme is able to extract a su¢ cient amount of revenue.
It is also illustrative to compare the pricing schemes with respect to utilization. It can be shown
that the relevant metric is w=v: (Note, with a xed capacity we use w=v for making comparisons
between the two pricing schemes, but now  is endogenous and di¤erent across schemes.) Table
2 provides the rms utilization under each pricing scheme when capacity is ec; i.e., when the cost
of capacity is such that per-use and subscription pricing yield the same prot. (If w were any
higher, then subscription pricing dominates per-use pricing for all utilizations that yield a positive
prot, i.e., in that case we enter the w > ew regime.) We observe numerically that utilization is
increasing in c with each pricing scheme. Consequently, subscription pricing is better than per
use pricing for all utilizations that are lower than those indicated in the table. For example, when
w=v = 0:03; subscription pricing is better than per-use pricing whenever it yields a utilization
of 80% or lower. The table indicates that subscription pricing can be better than per-use pricing
misleading to conclude from those conditions that a high capacity cost favors per-use pricing in all circumstances.
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Table 2. Utilization when capacity is such that subscription pricing and per-use pricing yield the same
prot (i.e., c = ~c):
w=v up us
0.030 61.35% 80.19%
0.025 64.05% 81.87%
0.020 67.16% 83.67%
0.010 75.43% 88.36%
0.0050 81.87% 91.72%
0.0025 86.77% 94.12%
0.0020 88.07% 94.75%
0.0010 91.38% 96.26%
0.0005 93.82% 97.35%
0.0002 96.04% 98.32%
0.0001 97.18% 98.81%
0.00005 97.99% 99.16%
0.00001 99.10% 99.62%
even if the utilization rate is quite high (say, higher than 98%). Therefore, as in the previous two
models, subscription pricing can be better than per-use pricing even if it results in a highly utilized
system.
6 Extensions: Third-Party Revenue
Just as in the queuing literature with pricing, our base model assumes revenue is earned from
customers and only directly from customers. However, there are services that are able to generate
revenue indirectly from their customers. For example, AOL can charge for its internet service
but also can collect revenue from rms based on its customers transactions. Other rms, such as
Yahoo and Google, do not charge customers for their on-line search services, but do collect revenue
from rms based on those searches (e.g., Googles AdWords revenue, Auchard 2007). The purpose
of this section is to explore how the relative merits of per-use and subscription pricing compare
in the presence of third-party revenue (i.e., revenue that is not earned from customers but rather
from other sources based on customer usage of the service).
Consider our xed capacity model (section 3) with W () = 1=(  ), but now the rm earns
r per transaction from sources other than customers.15 The inclusion of r has no direct impact on
customers, so their decisions remain unchanged with respect to whether to purchase a subscription
15Alternatively, a rm may generate third-party revenue that is proportional to the number of customers. For
example, retail banks collect deposits from their customers and those deposits generate revenue. In our model all
customers use the service with either pricing scheme, so this source of revenue does not have an impact on the analysis
of our model.
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and on which service opportunities to use the service. Thus, the per-use revenue function is
Rp(v) =  F (v)

v   w
   F (v)
+ r

;
where v is the customersthreshold for seeking service or not. The rms optimal threshold, vp; is
now implicitly dened by
vp + r =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+
w 
   F (vp)
2 :
The subscription revenue function is:
Rs(v) =  F (v) (E [V jV  v]  v + r) :
The optimal threshold, vs; as before, is given by
vs =
w
   F (vs)
:
The subscription threshold, vs; is independent of r whereas vp(r) is a decreasing function of r -
as third-party revenue increases the rm naturally charges a lower price to use the service. Given
that the per-use price is
pp = vp  
w
   F (vp)
;
it is possible, for r large enough, that the optimal per-use price pays customers for the use of the
service (pp < 0): if the rm earns su¢ cient revenue per transaction, then the rm has an incentive
to encourage transactions.16
Di¤erentiation yields,
@Rs(vs; r)
@r
=  F (vs)
@Rp(vp; r)
@r
=  F (vp(r))
From vs < vp(0) and dvp(r)=dr < 0; it follows that subscription revenue initially increases faster in
r than per-use revenue but for some su¢ ciently high r; per-use revenue increases faster in r: We
can establish that vs = vp(er) for
er = F (vs)
f (vs)
+
w F (vs) 
   F (vs)
2 :
16We have assumed the reward per transaction, r, is independent of the number of transactions. In practice, it
would be a declining function of the number of transactions. Hence, we do not want to claim rms should pay
customers to generate transactions (because they may generate transactions that cannot be converted into revenue).
Instead, we are merely claiming that the presence of third-party transaction revenue may induce a rm to charge a
low per-use price, possibly even zero.
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When r = er; the per-use price is zero, pp = 0, and Rp (vp(er)) < Rs(vs): Thus, if third-party revenue
is such that the optimal per-use price is positive (i.e., the rm charges for the service rather than
pays customers to use the service), then subscription prot increases faster in r than per-use prot.
In this sense, third-party revenue favors subscription pricing over per-use pricing.17
All the results in this section hold for the industry standard model (section 4). Most results
generalize for the endogenous capacity model as well (section 5). More specically, in this case, we
get that @s(vs; r)=@r =  F (vs), @p(vp; r)=@r =  F (vp(r)), and dvp(r)=dr < 0, which lead to
favoring subscription over per-use pricing for r < er. However, as opposed to the other two models,
vs = vp(er) does not occur at a zero per-use price.
The two-sided markets literature also nds that a rm may want to charge a low per-use price in
a market. By doing so the rm creates a positive externality in a second market, thereby allowing
the rm to increase the price it charges in that second market. However, our results demonstrate
that the rm need not sacrice revenue in one market to earn it in another - with subscription
pricing the rm generates plenty of transactions (because the per-use fee is zero) while at the same
time the rm collects revenues (from subscriptions). Thus, we conclude that the attractiveness of
subscription pricing relative to per-use pricing is enhanced in the presence of third-party revenue.18
7 Conclusion
Using a queueing framework, we nd that a rm may prefer subscription pricing over per-use
pricing even if consumers dislike congestion. Furthermore, subscription pricing may be preferable
in situations that would a priori suggest a preference for per-use pricing: when the industry has
a standard that customers spend little time in the service process; or when customers strongly
dislike the time to complete the service thereby making congestion costly to the rm. Subscription
pricing can dominate in these situations because (i) the rm must invest in a considerable amount
of capacity to meet the standard or to reduce service times to a minimum and (ii) the rm can
cover that large capacity cost only if it can extract enough revenue from customers. Next, we
nd that the absolute advantage of subscription pricing can be considerable whereas the absolute
advantage of per-use pricing is generally modest - per-use pricing generates higher revenue or earns
17Note that by favor we do not mean Rs(vs) > Rp (vp(r)) ; 8r. As we have previously indicated, there exist
parameter values for which Rp (vp(0)) > Rs(vs), which implies that there exists a range of rewards r 2 f[0; r0] : r0 < erg
for which per-use revenue is higher than subscription revenue. Instead, we use favorto mean that Rs(vs) Rp (vp(r))
increases in r as long as r < er. That is, if we restirct attention to non-negtive per-use prices, once subscription revenue
is greater than per-use revenue, i.e. as r increases above r0, it remains greater for all greater r.
18 If r < 0, the the rm incurs a cost per transaction. In this case, an increase in the transaction cost (r decreases)
intuitively favors per-use pricing over subscription pricing.
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higher prot only when revenue or prot is reasonably low. Furthermore, some services are able to
earn third-party revenue that is proportional to the usage of its service. As that revenue potential
increases, subscription pricing becomes more attractive relative to per-use pricing - subscription
pricing encourages transactions (which increases third-party revenue) at the same time that it earns
revenue from customers. Overall, we conclude that the emphasis on per-use pricing in the queueing
literature is misplaced - we provide evidence that subscription pricing can indeed be the preferable
pricing strategy even in services that experience congestion.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Theorems 1 and 4 hold if F exhibits an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR). F is IGFR if
and only if xh(x) is increasing, where h(x) = f(x)= F (x) is the failure rate. That is, the IGFR
property is more general than the IFR.
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Proof of Theorem 1. That (2) is a local maximum is shown by examining the rst-order
conditions of Rp(v).
dRp(v)
dv
=  f(v)
 
v   wW ( F (v))

+  F (v)
 
1 + wf(v)W 0
 
 F (v)

Let %(v) = dRp(v)=dv. Noting that %(0) >  and that limv!1 %(v)  0, indicates that there exists
at least one maximum. Showing that the solution vp is unique will complete the proof. vp satises
the rst-order condition given by (2). Rearranging the terms in (2) gives:
1 
F (vp)
vpf (vp)
=
wW ( F (vp))
vp
+
w F (vp)W
0( F (vp))
vp
Since F is IGFR, f (vp) vp= F (vp) is weakly increasing in vp, and thus the term in the LHS is also
increasing in vp. The term in the RHS is strictly decreasing in vp; because F (v) = Pr fV  vg is
decreasing in v and W () is increasing and convex.
Proof of Lemma 1. For the per-use case, we have established in Theorem 1 that Rp(v) is
quasi-concave. Also note that Rp(v) = 0. v will be the maximizer, when the rst-order conditions
at v are non negative. Evaluating the rst-order conditions at vp = v we get: f(v) (w=  v)  0;
which is equivalent to w=  v=. Since Rp(v) = 0; this will imply that Rp(v) < 0 8v 2 [0; v).
Thus, we can limit our search space to the interesting case, w= < v=. In this case there exists an
interior solution that results in a positive per-use revenue rate. Performing a similar analysis for
the subscription case reveals that the condition for an interior maximum that guarantees positive
revenue rates is the same as in the per-use case, namely we must have w= < v=.
Next, we show that for any given  and , the revenue functions are linear in v, which implies
that v does not a¤ect the comparison between subscription and pay per use. The comparison can
be made solely on the basis of  and . To see that this is indeed the case, note that vs=v can be
implicitly expressed by:
vs
v
=

1  
 
1  vsv
 (10)
Thus, vs = v  g (; ), where g is a function of  and  only. Plugging vs into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rs =
(1  g (; ))2
2
 v
which is linear in v. Similarly for the pay-per-use case, we can express vp=v by:
vp
v
=
1
2
 
1 +
 
1  
 
1  vpv
2
!
(11)
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Thus, vp = v  h (; ), where h is a function of  and  only. Plugging vp into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rp = (1  h (; ))

h (; )  
1   (1  h (; ))

 v
which is also linear in v. Thus, to compare the revenues of the two schemes it su¢ ces to examine
changes in  and .
Proof of Theorem 2. Uniqueness: note rst, that lim!0Rs() =
(1 )2
2 and lim!0Rp() =
(1 )2
4 . Also, lim!1Rs() = lim!1Rp() = 0. Finally, we show that both Rs and Rp are
monotonically decreasing in  and that R0s() < R
0
p() 8. By implicitly di¤erentiating the revenue
functions, we get:
dRs ()
d
=    (1  g)
2
(1   (1  g))2
and
dRp ()
d
=    (1  h)
2
(1   (1  h))2
where g and h are shorthand notation for g (; ) and h (; ). That R0s() < R
0
p() 8 follows from
the fact that vs() < vp() 8 (see online companion for proof).
The threshold utilization factor, e, solves:
z =
(1  g (;e))2
2
  (1  h (;e))h (;e)  
1  e (1  h (;e))

= 0 (12)
Implicitly di¤erentiating (12) with respect to  yields:
dz
d
=

1  vs
v
 dg
d
+
1  vpv
1  e  1  vpv 
which is positive because vs is increasing in : Similarly, implicit di¤erentiation with respect to e
yields:
dz
de = 1  vsv  dgde + 
 
1  vpv
2 
1  e  1  vpv 2
which is positive because vs is increasing in e: Applying the implicit function theorem we then get
that de () =d < 0
Proof of Theorem 3. (i)  = 0: Substituting  = 0 in equations (10) and (11) results in vs =
v and vp = (1 + ) v=2. Then, the following expressions for the revenue rates are immediate:
Rs =
v (1 + )2
2
; Rp =
v (1 + )2
4
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(ii) !1: Rearranging (10), we get:
vs
v

1  

+
vs
v

=


As  ! 1; there are up to two roots that solve the above. The larger of the two is a maximum.
This implies that in this case, we have
lim
!1
vs
v
=
  1

:
Similarly, rewriting (11), we get
vp
v
  1
2

1  

+
vp
v
2
=

22
:
This implies that for all pricing schemes,
lim
!1
vs
v
= lim
!1
vp
v
=
  1

Substituting into the revenue rates, we obtain for !1:
Rs =
v
22
; Rp =
v (  1)
2
:
Thus, it follows that lim!1Rx = 0; x 2 fs; pg and that
lim
!1
Rs
Rp
= lim
!1
1
2  2 = 0:
Proof of Theorem 4. That (5) is a local maximum is shown by examining the rst-order
conditions of p(v).
dp(v)
dv
=  f(v)

v   w
I
  c

+  F (v)
Let %(v) = dp(v)=dv. Noting that %(0) >  and that limv!1 %(v)  0, indicates that there exists
at least one maximum. Showing that the solution vp is unique will complete the proof. vp satises
the rst-order condition given by (5). Rearranging the terms in (5) gives:
1 
F (vp)
vpf (vp)
=
w
Ivp
+
c
vp
Since F is IGFR, f (vp) vp= F (vp) is weakly increasing in vp, and thus the term in the LHS is also
increasing in vp. The term in the RHS is strictly decreasing in vp.
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Proof of Theorem 5. Substituting vs = w=I and vp =
v+w=I+c
2 in s (I) and p (I), respectively:
s (I) = 

v   w=I
v

v   w=I   2c
2

  cI
and
p (I) =
 (v   w=I   c)2
4v
  cI
Di¤erentiating with respect to I, we get:
@s
@I
=
w
I2

v   w=I   c
v

  c
and
@p
@I
=
w
I2

v   w=I   c
2v

  c:
Comparing both equations, we get the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 6. We prove by contradiction that if there is a maximum, it is unique.
Suppose there exist v1 and v3 such that v1 < v3; p(v1)  0; p(v3)  0, 0p(v1) = 0; 0p(v3) = 0;
i.e., both are local maxima with positive prots. Our conditions imply for both v 2 fv1; v3g that
v   c =
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
v   c
2
 p
F (v)
Combining the two conditions we have
F (v)
f(v)
 p
F (v)
Given that v1 and v3 are local maxima, there must be a local minima, v2; such that v1 < v2 < v3:
There are two cases to consider: p(v2) < 0 and p(v2) > 0:
Consider p(v2) < 0: Analogous to (6), 0p(v2) = 0 and p(v2) < 0 imply
F (v2)
f(v2)
<
p
F (v2)
(13)
Because F is IFR, the left hand side of (13) is decreasing. Furthermore, the right hand side of (13)
is increasing. As a result, v1 < v2 < v3 implies
F (v1)
f(v1)
>
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
F (v3)
f(v3)
(14)
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and
p
F (v3)
>
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
: (15)
Combining (13), (14) and (15) yields
F (v3)
f(v3)
<
F (v2)
f(v2)
<
p
F (v2)
<
p
F (v3)
;
which contradicts (6).
Consider the second case, p(v2) > 0: Denote
z(v) =  v +
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
+ c
Di¤erentiate:
z0(v) =  1 

f 0(v) F (v) + f(v)2
f(v)2

+
f(v)
2 F (v)
p
F (v)
Given that F is IFR, the second term is negative. (6) implies the third term is less than 1/2.
Hence, z0(v) < 0 for v1; v2 and v3: Because 0p(v1) = 
0
p(v2) = 
0
p(v3) = 0; it follows that
z(v1) = z(v2) = z(v2) = 0: However, due to the continuity of z(v); this is not feasible if z0(v) < 0
for v1; v2 and v3:
Observe that p(0) =  c  2
p
cw is negative and that limv!v p(v) = 0. Given that p(0)
is nite and limv!v p(v) = 0; a maximum exists if there exists a vp < v such that 0p(vp) = 0 and
p(vp)  0: Requiring that p(vp)  0 is equivalent to having
p(v)
 F (v)
= v   c  2p
F (v)
 0
for some v. Assume  = 0. If v > c, there must be a solution with positive prot. Let Mp() 
p(vp () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have:
@Mp()
@
=  
q
F (vp) < 0
which means that p(vp () ; ) is decreasing in : This implies there exists some p such that
p(vp () ; ) for   p: Otherwise, there does not exist an optimal vp < v.
vp is the smallest solution to (7): While we cannot show the number of possible solutions
to (7) for a general IFR distribution F , we show by contradiction, that the optimal vp is the
smallest solution to (7). Suppose there exist v1 and v3 such that v1 < v3; p(v1) < 0; p(v3) < 0,
0p(v1) = 0; 
0
p(v3) = 0; i.e., both are local maxima with negative prots. Our conditions imply for
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both v 2 fv1; v3g that
v   c =
F (v)
f(v)
+
p
F (v)
v   c
2
<
p
F (v)
Combining the two conditions we have
F (v)
f(v)
<
p
F (v)
Assume there exists a local maxima, v2; such that v1 < v2 < v3 and p(v2) > 0: This implies that
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
p
F (v2)
(16)
Consider v1. Because F is IFR, v1 < v2 implies:
F (v1)
f(v1)
>
F (v2)
f(v2)
(17)
and
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
: (18)
Combining conditions (16) and (18), we get:
F (v2)
f(v2)
>
p
F (v2)
>
p
F (v1)
>
F (v1)
f(v1)
which contradicts condition (17). Letting v2 < v3, however, a contradiction cannot be reached,
which does not preclude the existence of additional solutions to (7) in the negative range for a
general IFR distribution.
Su¢ cient condition for at most two solutions to (7): Rearranging (7), we have:
vp  
1
h (vp)
=
q
F (vp)
+ c:
The RHS is convex and increasing and the LHS is increasing. Taking the derivative of the LHS,
we get 1 + h0(vp)= (h (vp))
2 : Thus, if condition (A1) holds, there can be at most two solutions to
(7), with the smallest one being the maximum.
Proof of Theorem 7. First note that s(0) =  1 and that limv!v s(v) = 0. Di¤erentiating
s(v), we obtain:
ds(v)
dv
= c
 w
v2
+ f(v)

   F (v)
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Equating to zero and rearranging terms, the result in (9) follows.
A maximum exists if there exists a vs < v such that 0s(vs) = 0 and s(vs)  0: Requiring that
s(vs)  0 is equivalent to having
s(v)
 F (v)
= E [V jV  v]  v   c  
2
v F (v)
 0
for some v. Assume  = 0. Then, if E [V ] > c, there must be a solution with positive prot. Let
Ms()  s(vs () ; ). From the Envelope Theorem, we have:
@Ms()
@
=  2
vs
< 0
which means that s(vs () ; ) is decreasing in : Note that even though we have not ruled out the
existence of several local maxima vs, s(vs () ; ) is decreasing in  at every critical point. This
implies there exists some s such that s(vs () ; ) for   s: Otherwise, there does not exist an
optimal vs < v.
Furthermore, let
z(v) =  (1  c  h (v)) 
1
2
 
F (v)
  1
2 :
We want to show that there exists at most one vs that maximizes prot and solves vs = z(vs).
Di¤erentiating z(v), we get:
z0(v) =

2

c  h0 (v) (1  c  h (v)) 
3
2
 
F (v)
  1
2 + f (v) (1  c  h (v)) 
1
2
 
F (v)
  3
2

Plugging in (9), we get:
z0(vs) =

2

h (vs) vs +
c  h0 (vs) vs
1  c  h (vs)

:
A su¢ cient condition for z0(vs) to be increasing is for both terms in the brackets to be increasing.
The rst term is the generalized failure rate. It is increasing if F is IGFR. The second term is
increasing if h0 (vs) vs is increasing and F is IFR.
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In this technical appendix we provide the proofs of additional results relating to the main text
of the paper. Throughout this appendix, we introduce propositions that are not explicitly included
in the main text of the paper but are useful for deriving some of the intuitions and results that we
claim in the main text without proof. In addition, we report on a numerical study that generalizes
the analytical results. The rst section includes the proofs from the exogenous capacity models (§4
in the main text), while the second section provides the proofs from the industry time standards
section (§5 in the main text) and the third section provides the proofs of the endogenous capacity
case discussed in §6 in the main text. The fourth section generalizes the xed capacity model to
linear waiting costs and the fth section analyses the models to include mixed strategy equilibria.
The sixth section reports on a numerical study performed to compare between the pricing schemes
in the endogenous capacity case and the seventh section generalizes the third-party revenue result
for strictly concave and increasing revenue functions.
1 Proofs from the Exogenous Capacity Model
For the comparison between per-use and subscription, it is useful to introduce a third pricing
schemethe two-part tari¤. The two-part tari¤, combines a per-use fee and a subscription price:
e.g., a customer may have to pay a fee to join a golf club and then a fee for each round of golf
actually played. Where useful, we use the t subscript to signify notation associated with the
two-part tari¤ scheme.
A two-part tari¤ combines a per-use fee, p; with a subscription rate. As with per-use pricing,
a consumer with a value V for a service opportunity is indi¤erent between seeking service or not
when V  p + wW (): Therefore, the arrival rate to the rm is  F (v); where v is the unique
solution to v = p + wW ( F (v)). Revenue from per-use fees accrues at rate Rp(v); just as in the
per-use scheme, assuming all consumers are subscribers. As in the subscription case, the optimal
subscription makes allM consumers indi¤erent between purchasing the subscription or not. Hence,
subscription revenues are Rs(v): Total revenue from the two-part tari¤ is then expressed in terms
of the threshold for the subscription customer who is indi¤erent between paying the per-use fee for
service or not:
Rt(v) = Rp(v) +Rs(v)
=  F (v)
 
E [V jV  v]  wW ( F (v))

Note, unlike with subscription pricing, and just like with per-use pricing, the threshold v is a
decision variable for the rm. The following proposition establishes that there is a unique optimal
threshold for the rm.
1
Proposition 1 The rms revenue function with a two-part tari¤, Rt(v); is quasi-concave. Hence,
there exists a unique optimal threshold, vt = argmaxv Rt(v); where vt is the unique solution to
vt = wW ( F (vt)) + w F (vt)W
0( F (vt)) (1)
Proof. Existence: To prove that the function Rt(v) has at least one local maximum, write the
rst-order conditions:
dRt(v)
dv
= f(v)
 
wW
 
 F (v)

+ w F (v)W 0
 
 F (v)

  v

Let %(v) = dRt(v)=dv and examine %(v) at the limit points. Since %(0) > 0 and limv!1 %(v)  0 and
hence is less than %(0), it follows that Rt(v) has at least one maximum in the range. Uniqueness:
solving Rt(v) = 0, we get the FOC given in (1). Since the LHS is strictly increasing and the RHS is
strictly decreasing, Rt(v) is quasi-concave and there exists a unique threshold, vt, that is implicitly
dened by condition (1).
Proposition 2 The resulting two-part tari¤ threshold valuation, above which a customer requests
service, lies in between the threshold valuation in the pay-per-use case and that of the subscription
case, i.e., vs < vt < vp.
Proof. Denote right-hand-sides functions of conditions
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+ wW ( F (vp)) + w F (vp)W
0( F (vp)); (2)
vs = wW
 
 F (vs)

and (1) by gp(v), gs(v) and gt(v), respectively. Then, gs(v) < gt(v) < gp(v) 8v.
Since the LHS is strictly increasing in v, the result follows.
The following statement of Lemma 1 is more general than the statement of Lemma 1 in the
main text because it includes results about the two-part tari¤ pricing scheme.
Lemma 1 The optimal revenue with each pricing scheme (Rp; Rs and Rt) can be expressed in
terms of ; ,  and v; where  = w=v and  = =: Furthermore, all three revenues are non-
negative for  2 [0; 1] and linear in v: Consequently, the relative revenues (e.g., Rp=Rt; Rs=Rt;
and Rp=Rs) can be expressed in terms of  and .
Proof. For the social welfare case, we have established in Proposition 1 that Rt(v) is quasi-concave.
Also note that Rt(v) = 0. v will be the maximizer, when the rst-order conditions at v are non
negative. Evaluating the rst-order conditions at vt = v we get:

v
 
w 
  
 
v vt
v
2   vt
!
vt=v
=

v

w

  v

 0
which is equivalent to w=  v=. Since Rt(v) = 0; this will imply that Rt(v) < 0 8v 2 [0; v). Since
the revenue rates in the other two schemes are never higher than in the social optimal case, we
can limit our search space to the interesting case, w= < v=. In this case there exists an interior
solution that results in a positive social optimal revenue rate. Performing a similar analysis for
the pay-per-use and subscription cases, reveals that the conditions for an interior maximum that
guarantees positive revenue rates are the same as in the social optimal case, namely we must have
w= < v=.
2
Next, we show that for any given  and , the revenue functions are linear in v, which implies
that v does not a¤ect the comparison between subscription and pay per use. The comparison can
be made solely on the basis of  and . To see that this is indeed the case, note that vs=v can be
implicitly expressed by:
vs
v
=

1  
 
1  vsv
 (3)
Thus, vs = v  g (; ), where g is a function of  and  only. Plugging vs into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rs =
(1  g (; ))2
2
 v
which is linear in v. Similarly for the pay-per-use case, we can express vp=v by:
vp
v
=
1
2
 
1 +
 
1  
 
1  vpv
2
!
(4)
Thus, vp = v  h (; ), where h is a function of  and  only. Plugging vp into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rp = (1  h (; ))

h (; )  
1   (1  h (; ))

 v
which is also linear in v. Thus, to compare the revenues of the two schemes it su¢ ces to examine
changes in  and .
Finally, for the social optimal case,
vt
v
=
 
1  
 
1  vtv
2 (5)
Thus, vt = v  l (; ), where l is a function of  and  only. Plugging vt into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rt = (1  l (; ))

1 + l (; )
2
  
1   (1  l (; ))

 v
which is again linear in v.
Proposition 3 When  = 0, subscription is better than pay-per-use when  <
p
2 and vice versa.
When ! 1, subscription is better than pay-per-use when  < 1.
Proof. (i)  = 0: Pay-per-use. Rearranging (4) we get:
vp
v
  1
2

1  

+
vp
v
2
=

22
(6)
If  = 0; there are up to two roots that solve the above. The larger of the two is a maximum. This
implies
vp
v
=
 1
2 if   2
 1
 if  > 2
:
3
Substituting, it follows that
Rp(vp; = 0) =
(
v
4 if   2
v
2
(  1) if  > 2
Subscription. Rearranging (3), we get:
vs
v

1  + vs
v

=  (7)
When  = 0; there are up to two roots that solve the above. The larger of the two is a maximum.
This implies that in this case, we have
vs
v
=

0 if   1
 1
 if  > 1
:
It thus follows that
Rs(vs; = 0) =
(
v
2 if   1
v
22
if  > 1
Comparing the two revenue functions, we get that e (0) = p2. The corresponding revenue functions
are then given by Rs = Rp = v4 .
(ii)  ! 1: Rearranging (3) and substituting  = 1 we get the quadratic equation: 
 
vs
v
2
+
(1  ) vsv   1 = 0. The relevant root suggests vs ! v. As vp > vs (Proposition 2), it follows that
we must have vp ! v as well. Next, we conjecture that e (1) = 1 and verify that this is indeed the
case. Substituting  = 1 in (6) and in (7), we get:
vp
v
  1
2
vp
v
2
=

2
and vs
v
2
= ;
respectively. Note that  = 1 and vs = vp = v solve both equations. Also note that this solution
implies that Rs = Rp and thus satises e (1) = 1.
The following statement of Theorem 1 is more general than the statement of Theorem 1 in
the main text because it includes results about the two-part tari¤ pricing scheme. This version of
Theorem 1 implies that subscription pricing approaches two-part tari¤ revenues when the potential
utilization is low and that per-use pricing approaches two-part tari¤ for a high potential utilization.
Theorem 1 The following limits hold: (i) When  ! 0, Rs = Rt = v (1 + )2 =2 and Rp =
v (1 + )2 =4. (ii) When !1, lim!1Rp=Rt = 1 while lim!1Rs=Rt = 0 and lim!1Rx =
0; x 2 fs; p; tg.
Proof. (i)  = 0: Substituting  = 0 in equations (3), (4) and (5) results in vs = vt = v and
vp = (1 + ) v=2. Then, the following expressions for the revenue rates are immediate:
Rs = Rt =
v (1 + )2
2
; Rp =
v (1 + )2
4
4
(ii) !1: Rearranging (3), we get:
vs
v

1  

+
vs
v

=


As  ! 1; there are up to two roots that solve the above. The larger of the two is a maximum.
This implies that in this case, we have
lim
!1
vs
v
=
  1

:
Similarly, rewriting (4) and (5), we get
vp
v
  1
2

1  

+
vp
v
2
=

22
and
vt
v

1  

+
vt
v
2
=

2
;
respectively. This implies that for all pricing schemes,
lim
!1
vs
v
= lim
!1
vp
v
= lim
!1
vt
v
=
  1

Substituting into the revenue rates, we obtain for !1:
Rs =
v
22
; Rp =
v (  1)
2
; Rt =
v (2  1)
22
:
Thus, it follows that lim!1Rx = 0; x 2 fs; p; tg and that
lim
!1
Rs
Rt
= lim
!1
1
2  1 = 0
and
lim
!1
Rp
Rt
= lim
!1
2  2
2  1 = 1
which indicates that per-use is a good approximation of the social optimal when !1.
Proposition 4 The actual utilization rates given by F (vx ()) ; x 2 fs; p; tg are strictly increasing
in .
Proof. Two-part-tari¤: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (5), we get:
@vt
@
=
y
1 + y v
 v   vt
v
where y is given by
y =
2v 
1  
 
v vt
v
3
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Di¤erentiating the utilization rate with respect to  leads to:
@F (vt ())
@
= F (vt ())    f (vt ()) 
@vt
@
=
=
v   vt
v

1  
v
y
1 + y v

> 0
Subscription: Proving strict monotonicity for the subscription case is equivalent to the two-part-
tari¤ case, with y given by:
y =
v 
1  
 
v vs
v
2
Pay-per-use: Proving strict monotonicity for the pay-per-use case is equivalent to the two-part-tari¤
case, with y given by:
y =
v
1  

v vp
v
3
and the result follows.
2 Proofs from the Industry Standard System Time Model
With a two-part tari¤ the rm can adjust its price so that the consumer with value v is the
indi¤erent consumer, yielding an arrival rate of F (v) to the rm. Capacity still adjusts to
meet the standard, so (v) = I + F (v) : The expected time in system is I; so the consumer
incurs congestion costs at rate w=I: The rm sets the subscription rate so that all consumers are
indi¤erent between purchasing or not. Therefore, the rms prot function is
t(v) = F (v)

E [V jV  v]  w
I

  c(v) :
the rst term is the consumers surplus when v is the indi¤erent consumer and the second term is
the capacity cost. The following proposition establishes that an optimal threshold, vt, exists and
is unique.
Proposition 5 The two-part tari¤ function t(v) is quasi-concave and vt = argmaxv t(v) is
uniquely dened by
vt =
w
I
+ c (8)
Proof. That (8) is a local maximum is shown by examining the rst-order conditions of t(v).
dt(v)
dv
=  f(v)

v   w
I
  c

Let %(v) = dt(v)=dv. Noting that %(0) > 0 and that limv!1 %(v)  0, indicates that there exists
at least one maximum. Uniqueness is guaranteed because the RHS of (8) is constant in v.
Proposition 6 x(vx); x 2 fs; pg is convex-concave in I if h0(v)=(h(v))2 is decreasing in v, where
h(v) is the hazard rate, h(v) = f(v)= F (v).
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Proof. Per-use: We rst nd a su¢ cient condition under which @vp=@I is increasing in I. Using
the implicit function theorem, we get:
@vp
@I
=   w=I
2
1 + h
0(v)
(h(v))2
< 0: (9)
Thus, we get that @vp=@I is increasing in I, if h0(v)=(h(v))2 is decreasing in v (and hence, increasing
in I). Applying the envelope theorem and di¤erentiating p(vp; I) with respect to I, we get:
@p(vp; I)
@I
=
w F (vp)
I2
  c (10)
Let %(I) = @p(vp; I)=@I. Note that limv!0 %(v) > 0 and that limv!1 %(v) =  c. To prove that
p(vp; I) is convex-concave in I is equivalent to showing that there exists a unique I that solves
00p(vp; I) = 0. Taking the second derivative, equating to 0 and rearranging, we get:
I
@vp
@I
=  2
F (vp)
f (vp)
:
Given the su¢ cient condition above, because F is IFR, the term on the RHS is decreasing in I and
the term on the LHS is increasing in I, providing the desired result.
Subscription: Following the same steps as in the per-use case, we nd:
@vs
@I
=  w
I2
< 0 (11)
which is increasing in I. Di¤erentiating s(vs; I) with respect to I, we get:
@s(vs; I)
@I
=
w F (vs)
I2
(1  ch(vs))  c (12)
Let %(I) = @s(vs; I)=@I. Note that limv!0 %(v) > 0 and that limv!1 %(v) =  c. To prove that
s(vs; I) is convex-concave in I is equivalent to showing that there exists a unique I that solves
00s(vs; I) = 0. Taking the second derivative, equating to 0 and rearranging, we get:
I
@vs
@I

h0(vs)
h2(vs)
+
1
ch(vs)
  1

=  2 (1  ch(vs))
ch2(vs)
:
Because @vs=@I is increasing in I; F is IFR and given the su¢ cient condition above, all terms
in the LHS are increasing in I while the term in the RHS is decreasing in I, so the function is
convex-concave in I.
Proposition 7 If F (vp) < F (vs) (1  ch (vs)) ; then @p=@I < @s=@I. Furthermore, if condition
(A1) holds, then there exists a unique eI such that @p=@eI = @s=@eI.
Proof. Fix I. Comparing equations (10) and (12) we get the rst result. To show uniqueness,
consider @p=@eI = @s=@eI. Rearranging the condition, we have:
1  ch (vs) =
F (vp)
F (vs)
:
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Because F is IFR, the LHS is increasing in I. It remains to show that F (vp) =F (vs) is decreasing
in I: Di¤erentiating F (vp) =F (vs) with respect to I, we get:
@
@I

F (vp)
F (vs)

=  F (vp)
F (vs)

h (vp)
@vp
@I
  h (vs)
@vs
@I

:
To show that F (vp) =F (vs) is decreasing in I is equivalent to showing that the bracketed term
is positive. Because vs < vp and F is IFR, h (vp) > h (vs) : Thus, it is enough to show that
@vp=@I > @vs=@I. From (9) and (11), we have:
@vp
@I
  @vs
@I
=  w
I2
0@ 1
1 + h
0(v)
(h(v))2
  1
1A
which is positive if (A1) holds.
Proposition 8 When V  U [0; v], s > p if w=I  v  
 p
2 + 1

c.
Proof. The subscription prot function is given by:
s = F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs   c)  cI
The pay-per-use prot function is given by
p =  F (vp)

vp  
w
I
  c

  cI =
=  F (vp) (vp   vs   c)  cI
where the second equality holds because vs = w=I. s > p when the following condition holds:
F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs   c) > F (vp) (vp   vs   c)
Substituting vp = v+vs+c2 for the uniform and applying some algebra gives the desired result.
3 Proofs from the Endogenous Capacity Model
Like with a xed capacity, with a two-part tari¤ the rms revenue is Rt(v); where v is the value
of the consumer who, at a service opportunity, is indi¤erent between seeking service or not. By
adding in the cost of capacity, the rms prot function is
t(v; ) =  F (v)

E [V jV  v]  w
   F (v)

  c:
As with per-use pricing, t(v; ) is concave in  for a xed v and t(v) = p(v) is the optimal
capacity. The prot function can then be written as
t(v) = t(v; t(v))
=  F (v)
 
E [V jV  v]  c  2p
F (v)
!
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The next proposition characterizes the rms optimal policy. The proposition holds for any increas-
ing generalized failure rate (IGFR) distribution1.
Proposition 9 If v > c, there exists an upper bound , such that for every    there exists
a unique interior optimal threshold level, vt = argmaxv t(v); which is implicitly dened by the
smaller of two possible solutions to:
vt =
p
F (vt)
+ c: (13)
The optimal capacity is
t =
wvt
(vt   c)2
; (14)
and the optimal pricing parameters are
pt = c
kt = F (vt) (E [vjv  vt]  vt)
Proof. Let
z(v) =
p
F (v)
+ c:
Di¤erentiating, we get:
z0(v) =

2
p
F (v)
 f (v)F (v)
:
Notice that z0 (v) > 0. Because vt = z (vt), we have:
p
F (vt)
= vt   c:
z0 (vt) thus becomes:
z0 (vt) =
vt   c
2
 f (vt)F (vt)
Next, we show that z0 (vt) is increasing by showing that z00 (vt) > 0.
z00 (vt) =
1
2

(f (vt) + (vt   c) f 0 (vt)) F (vt) + (vt   c) f2 (vt)
 
F (vt)
2
z00 (vt) > 0 i¤ the bracketed term (f (vt) + (vt   c) f 0 (vt)) F (vt) + (vt   c) f2 (vt) > 0. Rearranging
terms, the condition becomes:
vt
vt   c
f (vt) F (vt) + vtf
2 (vt) >  vtf 0 (vt) F (vt) (15)
Because F is IGFR, it follows that:
f (v) F (v) + vf2 (v) >  vf 0 (v) F (v):
1F exhibits an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) i¤ xh(x) is increasing, where h(x) = f(x)= F (x) is the
failure rate. That is, the IGFR property is more general than the IFRdistributions that exhibit IFR are also IGFR,
but not vice versa.
9
This property of IGFR distributions and the fact that we must have vt > c, ensures that condition
(15) holds. Therefore, z00 (vt) > 0. Given that z(v) is increasing and z0 (vt) = 1 for at most one vt,
it follows that there can be only one vt that solves vt = z (vt).
Given that (0) is nite and limv!v (v) = 0; a maximum exists if there exists an vt < v such
that 0(vt) = 0 and (vt)  0: Requiring that (vt)  0 is equivalent to having
(v)
 F (v)
= E[V jV  v]  c  2
s
1
F (v)
 0
for some v. Assume  = 0. If v > c, there is a solution with positive prot. LetM()  (vt () ; ).
From the Envelope Theorem, we have:
@M()
@
=  2
q
F (vt) < 0
which means that (vt () ; ) is decreasing in : This implies there exists some  such that
(vt () ; )  0 for   : Otherwise, there does not exist an optimal vt < v.
Optimal pricing parameters: since customers are individual maximizers, customers care only
about their own disutility of waiting while choosing whether or not to request service. For any
given service rate level , customersindi¤erence is determined by a threshold valuation level ve
which satises: ve = wW
 
 F (ve)

. If the monopolist chooses a service rate t, the desired social
optimal valuation threshold vt is given by equation (13) and is equivalent to ve + c. Thus choosing
pt = c as the per use fee guarantees the social optimal congestion. Customers expected utility
under pt equals kt =
R1
vt
vdF (v)   F (vt) (ve + c). Setting the subscription rate to kt enables the
monopolist to extract the remaining welfare and together with the per-use price pt and the service
rate cost ct, his expected prot rate results in the social optimal welfare (vt).
As with xed capacity, the rm is able to extract all consumer welfare, so the two-part tari¤ is
optimal for the rm (again, assuming only a single price can be charged per transaction).
Proposition 10 Compared to the social optimal, the following hold:
1. In pay-per-use, the system is under congested and there is lower investment in capacity.
2. If V  U [0; v] subscription results in over congestion (vs = vt   c) and in higher investment
in capacity.
Proof. 1. Pay-per-use. Congestion: compare the thresholds given in (13) and
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
+
q
F (vp)
+ c: (16)
Let gt(v) =
p
cw= F (v) + c and gp(v) = F (v)=f(v) +
p
cw= F (v) + c. Since F (v)=f(v) > 0,
gp(v) > gt(v), 8v. Thus, it must be that vt < vp. Capacity: We have previously established that
the optimal service rate function (v) in
(v) =  F (v) +
r
w F (v)
c
is the same for both pay-per-use and the social welfare. Since 0(v) < 0, it follows that (vt) > (vp).
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2. Subscription. Congestion: Assume vt = vs+ c holds and check that the rst-order conditions
given in (13) are satised. For the uniform case, condition (13) becomes:
vt = 
s
v
(v   vt)
+ c
Substituting vt = vs + c, we get
vs = 
s
v
(v   vs   c)
which is exactly condition
vs = 
s
1
F (vs)  cf(vs)
: (17)
applied for the uniform distribution. Capacity: For the uniform case, we get:
(vs) =
w
vs
+
(v   vs)
v
and
(vt) =
wvt
(vt   c)2
=
w
vs
+
wc
v2s
where the last equality follows from substituting vt = vs + c. Now, (vs) > (vt) if and only if
2 <
v2s(v   vs)
v
: (18)
The condition must hold to get an interior solution to the problem. To see this, note that  =
(vot   c)
p
F (v) for V  U [0; v], where vot is the social optimal threshold level that solves both
(v) = 0 and 0 (v) = 0. Because we must have  <  for an interior solution, it follows that
 < (vot   c)
r
v   vot
v
As vt = vs + c, we get:
2 <
v2s(v   vot )
v
:
and because vs < vot , condition (18) follows.
Proposition 11 The following inequalities hold: (i) ut(c) > up(c) 8c (ii) if V  U [0; v], us(c) >
ut(c) 8c.
Proof. Let ux(c) =  F (vx)=x; x 2 fs; t; pg: (i) Theorem 6 and Proposition 9 imply:
1
ux
= 1 +
r
w
c F (vx)
x 2 ft; pg:
The result follows for every IFR distribution, because vt < vp (Proposition 10).
(ii) Let V  U [0; v]. We have:
1
us
=
wv
vs (v   vs)
+ 1 (19)
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and
1
ut
=
wvt
 (vt   c)2
 v
v   vt
=
wv (vs + c)
v2s (v   vs   c)
=
wv
vs (v   vs   c)
+ 1 (20)
where the rst equality follows from equation (14), the second equality follows because vs = vt   c
(Proposition 10) and the third equality from substituting in (17). Comparing (19) and (20), the
result follows.
Proposition 12 Let ew be the maximum w such that p(w)  0 and p(w)  s(w). If v > 
1 +
p
2

c, then either there exists a unique threshold ew such that for w < ew it is better to sell
subscriptions and for w > ew, using pay-per-use results in higher prots, or subscription is always
better than pay-per-use, conditional on obtaining positive prots. Otherwise, if c < v <
 
1 +
p
2

c,
pricing on the basis of pay-per-use is always better than selling subscriptions.
Proof. Observe rst, that at w = 0, we have vs = 0 and vp = F (vp)=f(vp) + c = (v + c) =2
(when the second inequality follows from substituting for the uniform distribution). These lead
to s (vs;w = 0) = 
 R1
0 vdF (v)  c

= (E[V ]  c) and to p (vp;w = 0) =  F (vp) (vp   c) =
(v   c)2 =4v, respectively. Comparing between the prot functions, we get that s (vs;w = 0) 
p (vp;w = 0) i¤ v >
 
1 +
p
2

c. Rewriting equation (16) for the uniform distribution, we get:
(2vp   v)

1  vp
v

= c+
p
cw:
Similarly, from equation (13) we get:
vs
r
1  vs
v
  c
v
=
p
cw.
Let Ms(w)  s (vs;w) = and Mp(w)  p (vp;w) =. Substituting vp and vs, we have:
Mp(w) =

1  vp
v

(vp   c)  2
r
cw

1  vp
v

and
Ms(w) =
v
2

1  vs
v
2
 
r
cw

1  vs
v
  c
v

  c

1  vs
v

By the Envelope Theorem, we rst nd that both prot functions are decreasing in w:
M 0p(w) =  w 
1
2
r
c

1  vp
v

and
M 0s(w) =  
1
2
w 
1
2
r
c

1  vs
v
  c
v

=  1
2
w 
1
2
r
c

1  vt
v

where the second equality follows from Proposition 10. Thus, both prot functions are decreasing
in w. Applying some algebra along with the fact that vt < vp, we get that M 0s(w) < M
0
p(w) < 0
12
8w. Combining this with the condition at w = 0, the three cases follow.
Proposition 13 Let ec be the maximum c such that p(c)  0 and p(c)  s(c). Then either
there exists a unique capacity cost threshold ec, below which it is better to use subscription and above
which using per use pricing results in higher prots or subscription is always better than pay-per-use,
conditional on obtaining positive prots2.
Proof. Observe rst, that at c = 0, we have vs = 0 and vp = F (vp)=f(vp). These lead to
s (vs; c = 0) = E[V ] and to p (vp; c = 0) =  F (vp)vp, respectively. Because s (vs; c = 0) =
t (vt; c = 0), we must have p (vp; c = 0)  s (vs; c = 0). Let Ms(c)  s (vs; c) and Mp(c) 
p (vp; c). By the Envelope Theorem, M 0s(c) =  s < 0 and M 0p(c) =  p < 0. Using the
assumption that s > p, we get that jM 0s(c)j >
M 0p(c) 8c. From this and the fact that
s (vs; c = 0) > p (vp; c = 0), the result follows. Because it might be that s(vs;ec) = p(vp;ec) < 0,
and we are only interested in the non-negative range of the prot functions, subscription might be
better than pay-per-use in the entire relevant range.
4 Extension to Linear Waiting Costs
In this section we assume that customerswaiting costs are a function of the value of the service.
More specically, we assume that waiting costs are linear in the value, i.e. w(v) = a + bv. In
the base models we assumed that b = 0, but consumerspatience may depend on the value they
attach to the service. Customers may be more patient (b < 0) or less patient (b > 0) as their
value increases. In what follows, we analyze the exogenous capacity case under this assumption.
As noted in the main text, the results obtained under constant waiting costs generalize when we
allow for b 6= 0.
4.1 Per-Use Pricing
Given that p, a; b and  are common to all customers (they all have the same expectations) and
constant across time, there is some threshold value, v; such that a customer seeks service whenever
the realized value of an opportunity is v or greater, and otherwise the customer passes on the
opportunity:
v = p+ (a+ bv)W ():
The actual arrival rate to the service is then  F (v) : The next proposition establishes the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium per-use threshold.
Proposition 14 The per-use threshold value, v, given by:
v = p+ (a+ bv)W ( F (v)) (21)
exists and is unique.
Proof. For expectations to be consistent with actual operating conditions (i.e.,  =  F (v)) the
threshold v must satisfy (21). To show uniqueness, consider two cases. If b < 0, uniqueness is
2This result holds in general for all IFR distributions assuming that s > p for all c. Note that the condition
s > p holds for the uniform distribution (Proposition 10) and is shown to hold numerically for the Weibull
distribution (with a wide range of parameter combinations) as well (see the numerical study in §6 of this appendix).
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guaranteed, because the LHS is increasing in v and the RHS is decreasing. If b > 0, rearrange (21)
as:
v(1  bW ( F (v))) = p+ aW ( F (v) :
Because b > 0, the LHS is increasing in v and the RHS is decreasing in v, so the threshold is unique.
To show existence, note that v must be positive. This implies that we must have 1 > bW ( F (v))
or b < 1=W ( F (v)). The condition holds for all v, because we must have b < 1=W () (otherwise
no customer joins) and W is increasing.
The rms revenue is Rp = p, which can be expressed in terms of the threshold v:
Rp(v) = F (v)(v   (a+ bv)W (F (v))):
The following proposition establishes that an optimal threshold, vp, exists and is unique.
Proposition 15 The per-use revenue function, Rp(v); is quasi-concave and vp = argmaxv Rp(v)
is uniquely dened by
vp =
F (vp)
f (vp)
 
1  bW ( F (vp))

+ (a+ bv)W ( F (vp)) + (a+ bv)  F (vp)W
0( F (vp)): (22)
Proof. That (22) is a local maximum, is shown by examining the rst-order conditions of Rp(v).
dRp(v)
dv
=  f(v)
 
v   (a+ bv)W ( F (v))

+
+ F (v)
 
1 + (a+ bv) f(v)W 0( F (v)

)  bW ( F (v)))
Let %(v) = dRp(v)=dv. Noting that %(0) >  (because 1 > bW ()) and that limv!1 %(v)  0,
indicates that there exists at least one maximum. Showing that the solution vp is unique will
complete the proof. vp satises the rst-order condition given by (22). Consider b < 0 and b > 0
separately. If b < 0, the LHS is increasing and the RHS is decreasing ensuring a unique vp. If b > 0,
rearranging the terms in (22) gives:
vp
 
1  b F (vp)W 0( F (vp)

)  bW ( F (vp))vp

1 
F (vp)
vpf (vp)

= aW ( F (vp)) +
F (vp)
f (vp)
+ a F (vp)W
0   F (vp)
Since F is IFR, the LHS is increasing in vp and the RHS is decreasing in vp, guaranteeing uniqueness.
4.2 Subscription Pricing
Under subscription, in equilibrium, the indi¤erent consumers value, vs; exactly equals the expected
congestion cost:
vs = (a+ bvs)W
 
 F (vs)

: (23)
Proving the existence and uniqueness of the subscription threshold value follows the same lines of
Proposition 14 and will not be repeated.
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4.3 Comparison
This section compares the revenues generated by the two pricing schemes. To make these com-
parisons more explicit, we assume in this section V  U [0; v] and W () = 1=( ): The following
proposition generalize the comparative results from the xed capacity case to allow for linear waiting
costs.
The next proposition denes the set of parameters for which the rm can earn non-negative
revenue. Although the rms problem is determined by ve parameters (a; b; ;  and v), the next
theorem indicates that the pricing schemesrelative rankings depend only on three of them.
Proposition 16 [generalization of Lemma 1] The optimal revenue with each pricing scheme (Rp
and Rs) can be expressed in terms of ; ; ,  and v; where  = a=v,  = b= and  = =:
Furthermore, the two revenues are non-negative for (+ ) 2 [0; 1] and linear in v: Consequently,
the relative revenue, Rs=Rp; can be expressed in terms of ;  and .
Proof. For the per-use case, we have established in Proposition 15 that Rp(v) is quasi-concave.
Also note that Rp(v) = 0. v will be the maximizer, when the rst-order conditions at v are non
negative. Evaluating the rst-order conditions at vp = v we get:   (v   (a+ bv) =) =v  0; which
is equivalent to +  1. Since Rp(v) = 0; this will imply that Rp(v) < 0 8v 2 [0; v). Thus, we can
limit our search space to the interesting case, + < 1. In this case there exists an interior solution
that results in a positive per-use revenue rate. Performing a similar analysis for the subscription
case, reveals that the condition for an interior maximum that guarantees positive revenue rates is
the same as in the per-use case.
Next, we show that for any given ;  and , the revenue functions are linear in v, which implies
that v does not a¤ect the comparison between subscription and pay per use. The comparison can
be made solely on the basis of ;  and . To see that this is indeed the case, note that vs=v can
be implicitly expressed by:
vs
v
=
+  vsv
1  
 
1  vsv
 (24)
Thus, vs = v  g (; ; ), where g is a function of ;  and  only. Plugging vs into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rs =
(1  g (; ; ))2
2
 v
which is linear in v. Similarly for the pay-per-use case, we can express vp=v by:
vp
v
=

1  vp
v
 
1 +
(+ )    
1  
 
1  vpv
2
!
+
+ 
vp
v
1  
 
1  vpv
 (25)
Thus, vp = v  h (; ), where h is a function of ;  and  only. Plugging vp into the subscription
revenue function, we obtain:
Rp = (1  h (; ; ))

h (; ; )  + h (; ; )
1   (1  h (; ; ))

 v
which is also linear in v. Thus, to compare the revenues of the two schemes it su¢ ces to examine
changes in ;  and .
Next, we show that there is a single crossing point for the two revenue functions, Rs and Rp.
Proposition 17 establishes the result analytically for b < 0.
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Proposition 17 [generalization of Theorem 2] If b < 0, for each pair of values (; ), there exists
a unique e (; ), such that subscription yields higher revenue than per-use pricing for  < e (; ).
Otherwise, per-use pricing yields higher revenue.
Proof. Uniqueness: note rst, that lim!0Rs() = v2

1  
1 
2
and lim!0Rp() =
v(1  )2
4(1 ) .
Also, lim!1Rs() = lim!1Rp() = 0. Finally, we show that both Rs and Rp are monotonically
decreasing in  and that R0s() < R
0
p() 8. By implicitly di¤erentiating the revenue functions, we
get:
dRs ()
d
=  (1  g)
2 (+ g)
(1   (1  g))2
and
dRp ()
d
=  (1  h)
2 (+ h)
(1   (1  h))2
where g and h are shorthand notation for g (; ; ) and h (; ; ). To establish that R0s() < R
0
p()
8, note that vs() < vp() 8. The result follows immediately if b < 0 (note,  = b=, so
b < 0,  < 0). To see that, let
z(x) =  (1  x)
2 (+ x)
(1   (1  x))2
:
Observe that if  < 0, both terms in the numerator are decreasing in x and the term in the
denominator is increasing in x, so that z0(x) > 0: Thus, because g < h, we must have that
R0s() < R
0
p() 8.
While we were unable to show that there is a single crossing point when b > 0, the result
does hold numerically. Because we must have  +  < 1 to achieve positive prots, we were able
to cover the entire parameter space by choosing di¤erent values of  > 0,  > 0 such that the
condition holds. Table 1 provides the potential utilization rate, e(; ); at which the two schemes
yield the same revenue. For each pair of values (; ) in the table (and for 60 additional (; )
pairs that satisfy  +  < 1 and   0), we demonstrate numerically that there exists a uniquee(; ) that yields the same revenue for both pricing schemes. This implies that, analogously to
the xed waiting cost case, subscription pricing is the preferable pricing scheme for all  < e(; )
whereas per-use is preferable if  > e(; ).
5 Analysis of Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In this section we extend the analysis of the three subscription models to allow for mixed strategy
equilibria. Under pure strategies, the monopolist charges a subscription price k and makes all M
customers buy. If we allow for mixed strategy equilibria, the monopolist can charge a subscription
price k () such that a fraction  of the customers purchase and 1   do not ( 2 [0; 1]). In what
follows we show that allowing for a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the rm charges k () and
a fraction  < 1 of customers purchase subscription can be sustained in equilibrium when capacity
is xed and the service rate is low compared to the potential arrival rate (so that congestion is an
issue). In this case, the rm can extract higher revenues by charging a high subscription fee so
that only a fraction of the consumers buy. We also show that in all other cases the sustainable
equilibrium is the one in pure strategies. We assume throughout the section that w () = 1= (  )
and that V  U [0; v].
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Table 1. Potential utilization rates, e (; ) ; that yield identical revenue with per-use and subscription
pricing, as well as actual utilizations when the potential arrival rate is e (; ).
Actual utilization (%)
when  = e (; )
  e (; ) Per-use Subscription
0:99 0:000 1:002 0:25 0:5
0:75 0:000 1:069 7:05 13:84
0:75 0:249 1:249 0:03 0:06
0:50 0:000 1:153 16:4 31:34
0:50 0:250 1:336 8:95 17:48
0:50 0:499 1:500 0:04 0:07
0:25 0:000 1:263 30:48 55:44
0:25 0:250 1:445 21:46 40:32
0:25 0:500 1:604 10:91 21:19
0:25 0:749 1:751 0:04 0:09
0:01 0:000 1:411 64:84 96:81
0:01 0:250 1:587 42:37 73:15
0:01 0:500 1:733 26:31 48:61
0:01 0:750 1:867 12:33 23:85
0:01 0:989 1:984 0:05 0:1
5.1 Fixed Capacity
Given that a fraction  of the customers purchased a subscription, they will request service i¤
vs () = wW
 
 F (vs ())

(26)
Note that vs is increasing in . As less customers purchase a subscription, the threshold value vs
according to which a subscribed customer requests service decreases as well and he requests service
more often.
As part of the purchasing decision and given that a fraction  of the customers purchase, a
customer expects that a subscription generates the following net value per service opportunity,
F (vs ()) (E [V jV  vs ()]  vs ())
Given that service opportunities arrive at rate  , the rm can choose which k ()  k to set
(where k is the subscription price charged in a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e. when  = 1). Each
subscription price chosen corresponds to a unique fraction of customers, , buying a subscription.
k () =  F (vs ()) (E [V jV  vs ()]  vs ())
The rms resulting revenue can be expressed in terms of the fraction  :
Rs(; vs ()) = k ()M =  F (vs ()) (E [V jV  vs ()]  vs ()) (27)
where vs () is given by (26). The rm can control the fraction of customers subscribing by changing
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the subscription price, thereby also controlling congestion.
Proposition 18 In the xed capacity model there exists a unique equilibrium in which the rm
charges a subscription price k () and a fraction  of the customers purchase. Moreover, if   ,
then  = 1 is always optimalthe resulting equilibrium is in pure strategies. However, if  >  then
the resulting equilibrium is in mixed strategiescustomers purchase a subscription with probability
 = 1=.
Proof. Existence: total di¤erentiating (27) with respect to , we get:
dRs(; vs ())
d
=
@Rs(; vs ())
@
+
@Rs(; vs ())
@vs
 dvs
d
=  F (vs ())

E [V jV  vs ()]  vs ()  
dvs ()
d

where
dvs ()
d
=
 F (vs ())wW
0   F (vs ())
1 + f(vs ())wW 0
 
 F (vs ())
 > 0:
Let %() = dRs()=d. Noting that lim!0 %() > 0 and that the domain of  is closed from above,
indicates that there exists at least one maximum.
Uniqueness: rewrite (26) in terms of :
 (vs) =
  wvs
F (vs)
(28)
Plugging the expression in the revenue function, we get:
Rs(vs) =  (vs) k (vs)M =

  w
vs

(E [V jV  vs]  vs)
=

  w
vs

v   vs
2

where the last inequality follows because of the uniform distribution assumption. Solving for the
FOC yields:
vs =
r
wv

(29)
which is unique.
To nd the conditions for which  < 1 is optimal, plug equation (29) in (28). Simplifying, we
obtain that  (vs) = 1=. This  is achievable if  > . Otherwise, the optimal strategy is for the
rm to charge a subscription price k such that all consumers purchase a subscription ( = 1).
Note that the equilibrium found in the exogenous capacity model (§4 in the main text) represents
a lower bound on rms achievable revenues. If we allow for mixed strategy equilibria, given that
 > , the rm can do better by charging a higher subscription price and having a fraction  = 1=
of all customers purchase. Thus, it turns out that in the xed capacity case subscription can do
even better relative to per-use. If    (i.e. if service rate is high relative to the potential arrival
rate so that congestion is not problematic), the pure strategy equilibrium in which the rm charges
a subscription fee k such that all customers purchase is, in fact, the optimal strategy for the rm.
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5.2 Industry Standard System Time
The industry standard adjusts to the fraction of customers that join. In this case, vs () =
w=
 
s ()  F (vs ())

= w=I. The threshold is independent of  because the rm adjusts
the bu¤er capacity so that expected waiting time does not exceed the standard no matter what the
fraction  is. The rms prot is then
s(vs ()) = F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs)  c(vs)
= F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs   c)  cI
So the best the rm can do is to charge according to the pure strategy equilibrium ( = 1).
5.3 Endogenous Capacity
Proposition 19 demonstrates that when capacity choice is endogenous, the sustainable equilibrium
is one in pure strategies. That is, the optimal subscription price for the rm is the one found in §6
in the main text, which results in the entire customer base purchasing.
Proposition 19 In the endogenous capacity case, if E [V ] > c and   s, then  = 1 is always
optimalthe resulting equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Proof. Proposition 18 states that if  < ; then  () < 1. In this case, the indi¤erent customer
threshold satises vs () =
p
wv=. However, if  > , then  () = 1, in which case vs is implicitly
dened by vs = w=
 
  F (vs)

= w= (   (v   vs) =v). Given this optimal behavior for a xed
service rate, we are interested in nding the optimal service rate for the rm to invest in, s. The
rms prot function is given by:
s () =

F (vs) (E [V jV  vs ()]  vs ())  c(vs ()) if  < 
F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs)  c if   
=
(
1
2

 
q
w
v

v  
q
wv


  c if  < 

2v (v   vs)
2   c if   
where the last equality follows from the M=M=1 and uniform assumptions. It is easy to verify that
s is continuous and that it is strictly convex in the  <  domain (@2s () =@
2 =
p
wv=
 
43=2

).
Moreover, from vs  v, we must have that   w=v and s (w=v) < 0. In the domain   , the
optimal service rate satises s = F (vs) + w=vs (§6 in the main text). Provided that a positive
prot can be made (i.e. if E [V ] > c and   s), s   if and only if vs 
p
wv=. This
condition always holds, because vs = w=
 
  F (vs)

=
p
wv= when  =  and it is decreasing
in . Taken together, continuity, s (s) > 0 and the fact that s   imply that the optimal s
which maximizes the prot function under subscription involves the rm selling subscriptions to
the entire customer base ( = 1 is optimal) and it is chosen to be high enough so that s > .
In this proposition we assume that E [V ] > c and   s, which implies that the rm can make
positive prots. If positive prot cannot be made, then the best the rm can do is to set s = 0,
in which case nobody buys.
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6 Comparison of Pricing Schemes when Capacity is Endogenous
A Numerical Study
Analytical comparison between vt and vs for distributions other than the uniform is di¢ cult in the
endogenous capacity case. While we were unable to prove that vs < vt in general, an extensive
numerical study conrmed our intuition, and demonstrated that it was the case for the Weibull
distribution with   1 as well. The following proposition restricts the number of parameters
dening the problem.
Proposition 20 Separate manipulation of w and  adds no additional value to the comparison of
the pricing schemes over the manipulation of  = w=3.
Proof. First note that comparing the prot rates p (vp) ; s (vs) and t (vt) is equivalent to
comparing p (vp) =; s (vs) = and t (vt) =, because we are only interested in the functions
relative ranking. Notice that the threshold expressions given in equations (13), (16) and (17) are
all a function of : Moreover, the prot rate functions can be rewritten as:
t (vt)

=
Z 1
vt
vdF (v)  c F (vt)  2
q
c F (vt);
p (vp)

= F (vp)
 
vp   c  2
s
c 
F (vp)
!
;
and
s (vs)

=
Z 1
vs
vdF (v)  (vs + c) F (vs)

  c 
vs
which are all functions of c and  and never of w or  alone.
Proposition 20 limited the number of parameters required for manipulation. We observed that
it is not necessary to manipulate w and  separately, because they always appear as ratios both in
the optimal thresholds and the prot functions. Only the ratio  = w= inuences the ranking of
the two pricing schemes.
We constructed 784 instances using all combinations of the parameters in Table 2 4. The values
were chosen to cover a large parameter space. The Weibull distribution is completely characterized
by the parameters  and , where the mean of the distribution is given by   (1 + 1=) 5 (and
therefore depends on both  and ) and the coe¢ cient of variation (CV ) is a function of  alone.
Increasing failure rate distributions require   1. An increase of  decreases the CV , where  = 1
corresponds to CV = 1 (the exponential distribution). To cover the parameter space, we sampled
 uniformly so that a large range of CV s is covered. More specically, we have:  = 1 (CV = 1),
 = 2 (CV = 0:523),  = 3 (CV = 0:363) and  = 4 (CV = 0:281). The mean is an increasing
function of  and is not very sensitive to values of  6. Choosing  = f1; 10; 100; 1000g covers
scenarios with very low to very high valuation means. The problem parameters, c and  , were
chosen as a fraction of . Because an interior solution requires at least E[V ] > c, and  is a proxy
3The proposition applies to a general distribution F and is not restricted to the uniform distribution.
4The Weibull distribution was chosen due to its exibility. When  = 1, then the Weibull distribution reduces
to the exponential distribution. When  = 3:4, then the Weibull distribution mimics the normal distribution. The
distribution is IFR (in the weak sense) for   1.
5The Gamma function,   (z), is dened by   (z) =
R1
0
tz 1e tdt. For a positive integer z,   (z) = (z   1)!.
6 In fact, E[V ]  , where E[V ] =  for  = 1 and !1 and E[V ] <  for  2 (1;1).
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Table 2. Parameter values used in the numerical experiment.
Parameter Values
Valuation Distribution Weibull(; )
 f1, 2, 3, 4g
 f1, 10, 100, 1000g
 f0:001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.75, g
c f0:001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 0.75, g
Table 3. Threshold values ec under which subscription is preferable and over which pay-per-use is
preferable at w= = 0:001 and at dw= for di¤erent values of  and  of the Weibull distribution.
  ec (0:001) b ecb 
1 1 0.841 0.06 0.841
1 10 8.414 0.62 8.414
1 100 84.140 6.93 84.140
2 1 0.752 0.03 0.610
2 10 7.769 0.37 6.031
2 100 78.502 3.74 60.233
3 1 0.781 0.01 0.707
3 10 8.067 0.18 6.723
3 100 81.486 1.89 66.906
4 1 0.808 0.01 0.732
4 10 8.338 0.11 7.274
4 100 84.199 1.10 72.741
for the mean, we can focus on values of c for which c  . We bound  in the same fashion and
choose values of c and  that partition the range.
In all instances in which the optimal subscription prots were positive that is, there existed an
interior solution we observed that vs < vt and s > t. That is, as in the uniform distribution, the
numerical study suggests that subscription pricing results in over congestion and over investment
in capacity.
As was proved for the uniform distribution, we observe that ec is decreasing in  for the Weibull
distribution as well. In addition, we observe that ec is increasing in . Keeping all other parameters
constant, ec (), however, is not a monotone function. This is not surprising, because the Gamma
function is not monotone in . Table 3 provides examples of threshold values ec for di¤erent values
of ,  and  . b denotes the maximum value of  such that there exists a threshold level ec above
which pay-per-use is better. That is, for all values of  > b , selling subscriptions is better than
charging on a pay-per-use basis for all values of c. ecb  is the threshold capacity cost at that
maximum value.
7 Third-Party Revenues
The analysis of third-party revenues can be extended to a strictly concave and increasing revenue
function in the transaction rate. Strict concavity seems like a more reasonable assumption. Let
r
 
 F (v)

be total third-party revenue rate the rm incurs if the congestion in the system is  F (v)
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(where r0 () > 0; r00 () < 0). The per-use prot function is
p(vp) =  F (vp)

vp  
w
   F (vp)

+ r
 
 F (vp)

The subscription prot function is:
s(vs) =  F (vs) (E [V jV  vs]  vs) + r
 
 F (vs)

where vs, as before, is given by
vs =
w
   F (vs)
:
Notice that vs is independent of r () whereas vp(r) is implicitly dened by
vp + r
0   F (vp) = F (vp)
f (vp)
+
w 
   F (vp)
2 :
The uniqueness of vp is guaranteed because of the concavity of r (). Because r0 () > 0, vp is lower
than in the no third-party revenue case. The per-use price charged is lower and more customers
request service. As in the xed revenue per transaction case, it is possible that the optimal per-use
price pays customers for the use of the service (pp < 0). If the third-party revenue function is such
that er0   F (vs) = F (vs)
f (vs)
+
w F (vs) 
   F (vs)
2
then vs = vp(er): In this case, the per-use price is zero, pp = 0, and p (vp) < s(vs):
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